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ABSTRACT 
 
JOHN ESPOSITO: Maintaining the boundaries of nomos: 
Phthonotic responses to sociopolitical perturbations 
in Herodotus’ Histories  
(Under the direction of Emily Baragwanath) 
 
Herodotus begins the Histories with a series of princess-thefts, each resolved by a 
straightforward tisis response. This simple quantitative equalization is complicated by the 
Greek theft of Medea without recompense, and Paris appeals to this imbalanced theft as 
precedent. This appeal implies common east-west membership in a ‘nomotic system’ in a 
way that will contribute significantly to the rest of the narrative. The Candaules logos 
introduces the ‘inverse proportionality’ characteristic of the circumstances to which 
phthonos responds; the Croesus logos extends phthonos to the gods, which describes the 
nomotic system of the kosmos. The Cambyses logos introduces a political formulation of 
‘unlimited monarchy’ that precludes any nomoi whatsoever, and puts the Persian 
monarch in a potentially phthonotic relation to all others. Darius attempts to avoid 
phthonos from his subjects by imperial expansion, and Xerxes’ coerced submission to 
nomos in book 9 hearkens back to the Candaules logos in book 1. 
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0. Introduction: motivation 
 
 John Gould argues that the related notions of reciprocity and gift-exchange 
significantly structure Herodotus’ Histories.1 In this thesis I will attempt to expand this 
analysis, supplementing ‘reciprocity and gift-exchange’ with ‘tisis, nomos, and phthonos’ 
which, I believe, will help provide a clearer understanding of how these kinds of 
exchanges work in Herodotus. I will examine a number of key or ‘hinge’ passages, 
starting with the opening of book 1 and ending with the close of book 9, in which 
Herodotus presents the tisis-nomos-phthonos complex with particular clarity and 
complexity. 
At issue is the general problem of nomos in Herodotus2, and specifically the 
genesis of Herodotean nomoi: given that nomoi regulate human relations, which in 
economic terms are always exchanges of some sort, why do certain nomoi arise in the 
places and times at which they do? What are the circumstances to which a particular 
nomos’ regulatory force responds? I will glean the terms of my general answer from the 
opening passages of book 1, arguing that, in Herodotus’ opening narrative (as elsewhere 
throughout the Histories), nomos responds at the point where tisis fails, insofar as tisis 
addresses only quantitative equalities, and cannot comprehend quantitative non-equality. 
                                                 
1
 Gould 1989, 1991. 
2
 For a general discussion of nomos in Herodotus, see Powell 1938 s. v., Gigante 1956 passim; Evans 1965; 
in ancient Athens, Ostwald 1969; Humphreys 1987; Thomas 2000, 102-134; for Persian kings violating 
Persian nomoi, see e.g. Gould 1989, 26-27; Lateiner 1989, 140-144; for an extended treatment of nomos 
and kings in Herodotus, see MacNellen 1994. 
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This principle – that nomos begins where tisis ends, the specific difference being 
quantitative imbalance – means that nomoi arise, and are found useful by the respective 
communities, when some inequity needs to be addressed, but cannot be addressed by 
simple ‘equalization’. This inequity is addressed psychologically by phthonos, which 
obtains in x toward y when y’s good redounds to x’s harm3; by responding proportionally 
to phthonos-generating inequity, nomos responds to phthonotic circumstances and 
regulates individual humans’ responses. The opening of book 1 contextualizes such 
circumstances in the arena of interstate human relations; the other ‘hinge’ passages I will 
discuss offer the arenas of intrastate human and divine-human relations as parallel 
contexts. Just as the interstate inequity narrated in the opening chapters resulted from the 
collapse of ‘equal-for-equal’ exchanges regulated by tisis, and hence needed to be 
addressed by some sort of nomos, so also the simple kind of intrastate inequity resulting 
from social differentiation is addressed by nomoi regulating each member of a 
community in proportional relation to other community-members, and to the community 
as a whole. 
Monarchs in Herodotus pose a special problem for nomos4, and in several places 
the Herodotean narrative suggests why. The most straightforward answer comes from 
Otanes, who argues (3.80) that monarchy is a poor form of government because 
‘phthonos is born in men from the beginning (φθόνος δὲ ἀρχῆθεν ἐμφύεται 
                                                 
3
 See especially Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 1387b-1388b; Ranulf  1933; Schoeck 1967; Foster 1972; Walcot 
1978, Ben Ze’ev 1992; Elster 1999; Konstan and Rutter 2003, especially Harrison 2003; and Cairns 2003 
(which provides a fairly comprehensive bibliography). 
4
 Cf. Ferrill 1971; Waters 1971; Gammie 1986; Hartog 1988, 330-339; Lateiner 1989, 140-144; Christ 
1994; MacNellen 1994; Dewald 2003 and sources. 
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ἀνθρώπῳ)’.5 Moreover, Amasis’ advice to Polykrates (3.40), along with the whole 
Polykrates logos, refutes excessive monarchical wealth and power by appeal to the 
inevitable phthonos of the gods (θεῖον ἐπισταμένῳ ὡς ἔστι φθονερόν).6 These 
passages and others, most famously Artabanus’ ‘lightning strikes tall trees’ argument at 
7.10e (ὁ θεὸς φθονήσας φόβον ἐμβάλῃ ἢ βροντήν), present phthonos explicitly; 
this paper will argue that phthonos does a great deal of ‘behind the scenes’ work in 
Herodotus’ narrative, especially in monarchical contexts. For if monarchy is bad because 
divine and/or human phthonos always obtains, then phthonos is somehow related to the 
proper ordering of communities and divine-human relations – which nomos is supposed 
to regulate, whenever tisis is not enough. Monarchy is opposed to certain particular 
nomoi when the monarch’s desire and the normative impulse of custom or law come into 
material conflict, but unlimited monarchy is opposed to any and all nomoi, because 
nomos divides, and hence limits, in order to respond proportionally to quantitative 
imbalance. 
This formal contradiction between nomos and absolute monarchy helps tie 
together two notoriously slippery Herodotean, and generally Greek, usages, namely, 
tyrannos and mounarchos.7 For if the tyrannos is specifically the ruler who has come to 
power unconstitutionally, then the unconstitutionality of his accession entails the 
indivision, and hence potential unlimitedness, of the tyrant’s power – since politeiai are 
                                                 
5
 See Pelling 2002 for narrative complications of Herodotus’ presentation of Otanes’ argument. Lateiner 
1984 is a sensitive general treatment of this passage. See also Raaflaub 1987; Thompson 1996, 52-78. 
6
 The best discussion of this aspect of the Polykrates logos is found in Van der Veen 1996, 23-52. 
7
 For an overview of tyranny in ancient Greece see McGlew 1996. Parker 1998 offers an extraordinarily 
detailed semantic history of the word ‘tyrannos’, including earlier Near Eastern usages. For tyrannos and 
mounarchos in Herodotus, see note 3 above. 
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sufficient conditions for nomoi, inasmuch as nomoi are necessary conditions of politeiai.8 
But in both interstate and intrastate human contexts, as well as divine-human contexts, 
social and religious nomoi protect against the common phthonotic response by re-
establishing proportional, not quantitatively identical, relations. Such a reading of 
phthonos and nomos helps to establish a sound psychological foundation for political and 
economic analysis. Herodotus’ narrative, precisely in presenting individual human beings 
acting with convincing and intelligible psychological complexity, offers such a 
foundational account. 
The bulk of this paper will be devoted to showing how phthonos is related to 
nomos and tisis in Herodotus, especially how the tisis-nomos-phthonos complex appears 
in the narrative when kings do harmful (or potentially harmful) things. Exactly how 
phthonos generates nomos differs considerably in each particular instance of nomos, 
because phthonotic circumstances vary as extensively as the number of possible 
configurations of the relevant terms. Herodotus’ articulation of the tisis-nomos-phthonos 
complex, then, cannot be reduced to any ‘scientific’ formula, but rather must be 
understood in all the richness of the Herodotean narrative.
                                                 
8
 See Ostwald 1986, 370-72 and 367n119 with sources cited. 
  
 
1. The opening of the Histories: tisis, nomos, and quantitative imbalance 
 
 In the first sentence of Herodotus’ inquiry, the Persian logioi attribute 
responsibility (cp. αἰτίους) to the Phoenicians, which Herodotus describes in 1.2 as 
injustice (ἀδικημάτων).9 The first action anyone performs in the narrative is the 
Phoenician theft of Io; the second action is a response to the first (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα), the 
Greek theft of Europa. So far the narrator has not located either action in any interpretive 
framework: to this point, the Persian logioi, if they are wrong, are wrong simply about 
matters of fact. The Herodotean narrator emphasizes the possibility of Persian error by 
directing the first mention of an alternative account against a factual Persian claim10: 
Persians and Greeks agree that Io came to Egypt, but what the Greeks deny is the 
narrative the Persians offer (οὕτω μὲν Ἰοῦν ἐς Αἴγυπτον ἀπικέσθαι λέγουσι 
Πέρσαι, οὐκ ὡς Ἕλληνες). The Persian aitiology depends on the veracity of their 
narrative. Thus the disagreement between Persians and (implied) Greeks as to the causal 
explanation of east-west conflict lies in claims about particular actions; the Persian 
interpretation of these actions, if they really happened, does not enter into the discourse 
of alternatives. 
                                                 
9
 Dewald 1999 is the most complete discussion of the focalization of the opening chapters of book 1. 
10
 For the rhetorical effect of alternative accounts in Herodotus see Dewald 1987, 149-168; Lateiner 1989, 
76-90. 
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The first interpretive judgment in the Histories appears right after the Persian 
account of the Greek response to the Phoenician theft of Io: ‘on the one hand these things 
were for them equal for equal (ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ἴσα πρὸς ἴσα σφι γενέσθαι)’. The men 
sets this clause against the following de clause, where the Persians immediately juxtapose 
causality and injustice as they shift blame from Phoenicians to Greeks: ‘but after this the 
Greeks were responsible for the second injustice (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Ἕλληνας αἰτίους 
τῆς δευτέρης ἀδικίης γενέσθαι)’. The acceptability of ‘equal for equal’ suggested by 
the juxtaposition of the two clauses is implicitly granted.11 
Thus Herodotus presents this quantitative formulation of lex talionis as a regulator 
of human interactions that does not require any logical or rhetorical justification. This is a 
thoroughly Greek, and actually cross-culturally recognized fundamental principle of 
law.12 If the opening of the Herodotean inquiry is tightly structured13, then the fact that 
this is the first interpretive judgment in the whole work must be significant. The first two 
actions in the Histories, narrated as part of the Persian aitiology of the conflict between 
Greeks and barbarians, are instances of tisis, which Herodotus describes in terms of 
equality of exchange (ἴσα πρὸς ἴσα).14 
The first Greek theft of a princess was, then, justified by the self-evident lex 
talionis, and hence was neither blameworthy nor unjust. The second Greek princess-theft 
– the theft of Medea, narrated in the de clause at 1.2 – was unjust, because it was not an 
                                                 
11
 Cf. Pelling 2000, 155. 
12
 Pospisil 1971, 1-9. 
13
 See Moles 1993, 91-114; Dewald 1987; Dewald 1999, 223-33. 
14
 For notes on tisis and equality, see Lateiner 1989, 191-96. 
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instance of ἴσα πρὸς ἴσα. Thus the suggestively contrasting men/de construction, whose 
first clause expresses the ‘law’ of tisis as a quantity-equalizer, presents the theft of Medea 
narrated in the second clause as somehow opposed to quantitative equality. Indeed the 
quantitative ratio of princess-thefts between east and west is at this point 2:1, weighted 
toward the west; the Colchian king responds by demanding that the even the score by 
giving justice and returning the girl (αἰτέειν τε δίκας τῆς ἁρπαγῆς καὶ ἀπαιτέειν 
τὴν θυγατέρα). Already an inkling of some more complex regulator of human 
interactions than simple ‘equal for equal’ has snuck quietly into the picture: the Colchians 
did not try to steal a princess back, as the Greeks had done to the Phoenicians, but rather 
demanded dikas through a herald, and required that the princess-theft ratio be returned to 
1:1 by the return of Medea. But the state of affairs intended by this regulator is still 
simple ‘equal for equal’: the Colchian response is simply a more fully articulated form of 
lex talionis, justified by being aimed at the quantitative equality that tisis enforces. 
But the Greeks, say the Persians, reject this argument, on the reasoning that, since 
the Phoenicians did not give dikas for the theft of Io, so neither must the Greeks give 
dikas for the theft of Medea. This seemingly straightforward passage actually introduces, 
for the first time in the Histories, one of the key concepts of law, significant for the 
Greeks, namely, relevant similarity.15 The Greeks claim that their theft of Medea was 
somehow ‘sufficiently like’ the Phoenician theft of Io that what was appropriate in the 
first case was appropriate also in the second. The problem with the Greek argument is of 
course that there is no relevant similarity between the two princess-thefts: Tyre is not 
                                                 
15
 Pospisil 1971, 78-81. The legal and generally systemical concept may be related to Munson’s 
observation (2001a, 98) that meaningful similarities between two apparently different cultures are 
themselves ‘wonders’, one of the Histories’ chief concerns. 
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Colchis, and anyway the Phoenicians did lose Europa to the Greeks in response. So while 
the concept of relevant similarity is introduced in the Greek argument, the implied 
assertion of fact is denied by the narrative (wherein relevant similarity of the sort the 
Greeks affirm does not actually appear). 
But the Greek refusal to pay dikas for the theft of Medea sets a precedent that is 
relevantly similar to the next princess-theft, as Paris argues in 1.3. The Greek claim of 
relevant similarity does not fit the narrated facts; but Paris’ claim of relevant similarity 
between his contemplated theft of Helen, and the unavenged Greek theft of Medea, does 
fit the narrated facts, because the only fact Paris needs in order to establish relevant 
similarity sufficient to justify his action to himself is that the thief on whom the injured 
party made a claim of dikas did not actually pay it.16 The Greeks did not when they stole 
Medea, so Paris need not when he steals Helen. Thus Paris’ argument at 1.3 is the first 
time a legitimate appeal to precedent appears in the narrative – legitimate, at least, within 
the Persian account. The appeal to precedent is an appeal to nomos, to ‘the way things are 
in fact done’; and the relevance of the precedent depends on relevant similarity obtaining 
between actions of east and west.17 
The Paris narrative is enormously significant to the Herodotean presentation of 
tisis and nomos18; and it needs to be examined more closely. First, Paris needs a little 
more than simply some real similarity between the projected theft of Helen and the 
accomplished theft of Medea. Two thefts might be alike but not related as Paris relates 
                                                 
16
 Flory 1987, 27; Pelling 2000, 154. 
17
 Pospisil 1971, 11-37. 
18
 Wardman 1961, 134-38 analyses the various notions of casus belli operating the narrative to this point. 
More recent analyses of the significance of the opening narrative appear in Dewald 1999 and especially 
Pelling 1997. 
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them, namely, such that what follows one will also follow the other. But Paris, 
deliberating over what to do next, decides that what followed the first theft (non-dikas) 
will also follow the second theft. The absence of any further reasoning means that, in 
Paris’ view, princess-thefts of the sort common to the Greeks’ Medea-theft and his 
Helen-theft are related to their consequences in a definite and predictable way (namely, 
that dikas will not follow). Thus Paris is implicitly presupposing something common to 
east and west: that the same consequences follow the same actions when both westerners 
and easterners perform them. The claim that actions of this sort (namely, princess-theft) 
stand in the same relation to their consequences whether easterners or westerners perform 
them describes a kind of ‘law of consequence’ – not juridical law but rather ‘physical’ 
law, descriptive of human relations, whereby actions and what follows them are 
commonly and intelligibly related.19 
The juridical/physical distinction lies near the heart of Greek sophistic 
physis/nomos debates, and might be taken by Herodotus’ contemporary audience as 
gesturing in the direction of contemporary intellectual concerns. The Candaules logos 
will climax in a juridical application of nomos, but already the Persian Paris’ deliberation 
implies that east and west are located in the same system of consequence, and that the 
absence of juridical submission in one case entails the non-necessity of juridical 
submission in another relevantly similar case. 
  
                                                 
19
 Pospisil 1971, 28-36. 
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1a. Nomotic systems 
This location of east and west in the same ‘nomotic system’ affirms relevant 
similarity between east and west in certain contexts determined by consequence.20 This 
commonality has a flip side: if relevant similarity obtains between two parties, then one 
party’s benefit might redound to the other party’s harm. These circumstances arise 
whenever two parties are related in the way just described, for straightforward legal 
reasons: if two parties are subject to the same laws, then their relation to each other is at 
least partly determined by those laws, insofar as laws serve as regulators of human 
interaction. These interactive relations are, insofar as law-regulated, determinate, which 
is to say, literally, ‘bounded’; the ‘bounds’ of the nomos-regulated relations are what 
locate the relevant parties in their respective nomotic ‘places’ in society. 21 This is why 
politeiai are a kind of nomoi, indeed the ‘foundational’ nomoi insofar as they establish 
the basic sociopolitical structure in which all parties are related.22 
Now insofar as politeiai, along with other more specifying nomoi, put each citizen 
into a definite ‘location’ within a sociopolitical structure, the role of each citizen is 
determined by his or her location within that structure. Violation of these boundaries is a 
violation of nomos. But another, utterly crucial complication arises when the ‘boundaries’ 
                                                 
20
 The Herodotean breakdown of the hard-and-fast east/west dichotomy is discussed more generally in 
Pelling 1997. 
21
 Sealey 1994 offers a sophisticated discussion of the Greek idea of justice toward an approximately 
similar conclusion. 
22
 Pospisil 1971, 107-119. 
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set by law are actual divisions of a finite set.23 For when sociopolitical locations are 
determined within a finite set, the ‘establishment of boundaries’, which is the work of 
nomos, is also a division of the finite set into measurable, summable quantities. Nomoi 
(beginning with politeiai) thus divide society into finite sections. Whether these sectional 
‘cuts’ are made according to wealth, descent, or some other criterion, varies from one set 
of laws to another, but in every case the division is made according to distinctions that 
allow individual parties to be assigned to the appropriate sections with relative ease. But 
the constitutional histories, familiar to all students of ancient politics, show that some 
‘sectional cuts’ are more beneficial to the community than others. Whatever the 
intricacies that determine the ‘propriety’ of these cuts, it is surely the case that faulty, 
inappropriate cuts lead to grave social disruption and even revolution. The excellent 
legislator knows how to make these divisions ‘properly’. But the ‘excellent legislator par 
excellence’ in the constitutional history with which we are most familiar, that of ancient 
Athens, was Solon, whose legislation responded to the class-phthonos that was tearing 
Athenian society apart.24 
Herodotus’ earliest presentation of the Solonian legislative program is an allusion 
to (1.30), and later discussion of (2.177), a law taken from the Egyptians, which requires 
each citizen to justify his place in society. These passages will receive their own 
                                                 
23
 Later I will argue that the Herodotean narrative explicitly offers an alternate picture – that the set in 
which certain individuals (specifically Persian kings) is not finite – and then rejects this picture, for several, 
often overlapping reasons. 
24
 This is the position taken by the Ath. Pol. (2.1, 5.1). Ellis and Stanton 1968 offer an extended discussion 
of Solon’s reforms in these terms, which McGlew 1996, 87-123 updates usefully. Harris 2002 offers an 
antidote to overly casual readings of Marxist (historical-materialist) notions of class-envy into Solon’s 
poems and laws. Chiasson 1986 remains the most thorough discussion of the relation of the Herodotean 
Solon to the historical Solon, possibly excepting a paper that I believe remains unpublished, and to which I 
have not been able to get access (Mathieu de Bakker at a conference entitled ‘Solon: New Historical and 
Philological Perspectives’ at Soeterbeeck, The Netherlands, on December 14, 2003). 
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treatment below; but already in 1.3 the location of east and west in the same nomotic 
system implies that, at least in respect of princess-theft, east and west are ‘bounded’ in 
the way just described. If interstate and intrastate relations are commonly modeled as 
analogously ‘nomotic’ insofar as both participate in the kind of system of consequence-
relation described above, then the kinds of problems faced by states whose intrastate 
divisions are somehow ‘inappropriate’ will be analogously troublesome to systems of 
states whose interstate divisions are somehow ‘inappropriate’ in a correspondingly 
analogous way. The Herodotean narrative is expressly concerned with intrastate nomoi, 
and how these nomoi do their work (i.e., regulate society). The other matter the 
Herodotean narrative explores, which together with the various nations’ nomoi fulfils the 
programmatic promise opening book 1, is the ‘διαφορῆ’ between Greeks and barbarians, 
which in the Histories means primarily the Persian wars. Thus the Herodotean narrative 
is from the start concerned with what might succinctly be called, in nomotic terms, ‘the 
determinations of interstate and intrastate systems’ – the perturbation of which 
determinations, in the case of the interstate systems, is war.25 
 
1b. Nomos and phthonos 
 Keeping in mind this analogy, let us return to the concept of phthonos and treat it 
in terms of the ‘divisions’ mentioned above. The relation of phthonos to divisions of a 
finite set is straightforward: if a divided set is finite, then the quantitative variation of one 
                                                 
25
 The account presented in this section is crudely system-theoretic; for a brief system-theoretic account of 
envy, see White 1991. For Herodotean boundaries in general, see Immerwahr 1966, passim, esp. 325-26; 
Lateiner 1989, 126-44. 
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section is inversely proportional to the quantitative variation of the other.26 (If my brother 
eats five slices from an eight-slice pizza, then I can eat no more than three. The more 
slices he eats, the fewer I have any chance of eating.) Of course this inverse proportion 
holds when and only when both sections are really divisions of the same set – a common 
set-membership that we argued followed from a certain ‘relevant similarity’ between 
members. But this is exactly the kind of circumstance – i.e., ‘inverse proportion obtaining 
between relevant similars’ – to which phthonos responds. When the benefited is not 
relevantly similar, then no envy follows.27 (For example, humans feel more envious 
toward co-workers who have just received a ten-thousand-dollar raise than they do to a 
billionaire whose net worth has just increased by ten million.) 
Thus the concept of phthonos ties together (a) ‘nomotic’ divisions, (b) finiteness 
of divided sets, and (c) quantitativeness of nomotic regulation. This whole conceptual 
complex was introduced, as we have seen, by the opening narrative of the Histories 
where tisis failed and Paris responded by appealing to precedent, so introducing interstate 
nomos. In certain passages in the Histories, phthonos’ importance is already evident on 
the surface: Thomas Harrison (2003) discusses these adequately, arguing that phthonos 
functions in the Histories as ‘for Herodotus the primary motor of historical action’ (157). 
Harrison understands that envy has something to do with politeiai, and something to do 
                                                 
26
 This derivation, which puts metaphysics before ethics, is the inverse of that presented in Kaster 2003, 
which puts ethics before metaphysics. Kaster’s reversal is philosophically Cartesian, but an ancient 
rhetorical commonplace. The fact that the inverse proportionality must be perceived in order to be acted 
upon, which the tacit Cartesian might readily cite in favor of Kaster, argues in favor of my prioritization 
inasmuch as ‘false perception of phthonotic circumstances’ is a meaningful term, along with ‘deceptive 
appeal to phthonos’ and any number of similar, rhetorically significant terms. 
27
 This precludes the frequent sociological inference from envy to egalitarianism, presented in e.g. Schoeck 
1967, Elster 1999, and Cairns 2003. Moreover, since egalitarianism makes individuals, irrespective of 
differing social proprietates, the players on the zero-sum field, then if any divisions whatsoever are 
‘appropriate’, then egalitarianism is nonsensical (and will in fact produce phthonotic circumstances). Frank 
2005 offers a reading of Aristotle’s political theory in roughly this direction. 
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with imperial expansion, but only touches on the ‘inverse proportionality’ that, I have 
argued, is necessarily possible in any divided finite set. Thus even the opening three 
chapters of the Herodotean narrative encode a far richer understanding of tisis and nomos, 
and, if my analysis is correct, phthonos also, than Harrison’s brief survey.28 In the rest of 
this paper I will attempt to follow through several crucial passages in the Histories the 
development of this complex picture first presented in the Histories’ opening.
                                                 
28
 Harrison 2003, 158 asserts that Croesus is the first Herodotean character not to participate in ‘robotic tit-
for-tat’; his point is well-taken (and the Croesus logos, which I treat below, does explicitly relate phthonos 
and quantity), but Paris (let alone Candaules) is deliberating in a way surely a bit more sophisticated than 
‘robotic’. 
  
 
2. The Candaules logos: eros, phthonos, and not ‘looking to one’s own’ 
 
The first story given on Herodotus’ own authority is the Candaules logos. The 
deliberate structure of the Herodotean narrative suggests that this location, as the first of 
the logoi vouched for by Herodotus himself, is significant.29 Its narrative-initial position 
makes it ideal for developing the themes introduced in the introductory chapters.30 
The logos begins with Candaules’ eros toward his wife (οὗτος δὴ ὦν ὁ 
Κανδαύλης ἠράσθη τῆς ἑωυτοῦ γυναικός) (1.8.1). In the clause immediately 
following, connected by the participial repetition of the first clause’s main verb (ἠράσθη 
/ἐρασθεὶς), Candaules ‘supposes his wife to be by far the most beautiful woman of all’ 
(ἐνόμιζέ οἱ εἶναι γυναῖκα πολλὸν πασέων καλλίστην). The first, emotive verb 
related only Candaules and his wife, while the second, rational verb relates Candaules’ 
wife and all other women. Thus the set referenced by ἠράσθη/ἐρασθεὶς, which is 
emotive and hence non-calculative, as just two members, while the set referenced by the 
calculative ἐνόμιζέ/νομίζων is Candaules, his wife, and all women. The superlative 
adjective is καλλίστην, and Candaules and his wife are not relevantly similar in any 
respect presented in either sentence – Candaules and his wife are not being compared. 
                                                 
29
 Bravo and Węcowski 2004 discusses the formal structure of the opening narrative, concluding that the 
passage’s unity derives in great part from Herodotus’ self-presentation as a sophos integrating a large body 
of material in a single intelligible pattern. 
30
 See Immerwahr 1966, 46-78 for a general discussion of narrative ‘building’ in Herodotus. 
16 
 
But in respect of beauty Candaules’ wife and all other women are relevantly similar, as 
the superlative with the genitive of comparison πασέων expresses. 
The opening two sentences of the Candaules logos thus successively present 
systems of interpersonal relations of increasing size from ‘two’ to ‘many’. The repeated, 
logically unifying verb describing the first system was ἠράσθη/ἐρασθεὶς, which the 
story will eventually present as necessarily limited to two humans (1.11); the repeated, 
logically unifying verb describing the second system is ἐνόμιζέ/νομίζων, an 
‘estimation’ or ‘supposition’ that potentially takes unlimited objects (in this case, ‘all 
women’). Indeed the work of the ‘estimation’ is precisely to distinguish one object from 
all the rest. The distinction is expressed by the superlative adjective; the first ‘supposing’ 
in the authoritative logoi31, then, puts ‘relevantly similar’ humans in a relation such that 
one’s possession of a certain excellence necessarily redounds to the others’ lack of that 
excellence (namely, ‘greatest beauty’). Candaules supposes his wife to be ‘the most 
beautiful of all’: and this is the kind of circumstance to which phthonos responds. 
Candaules, however, is not satisfied with his wife being the most beautiful; she 
must also be known to be the most beautiful in the eyes of him whom he trusts. The 
narrative signifies this ‘trust’ in Gyges by τὰ σπουδαιέστερα τῶν πρηγμάτων 
(1.8.1), and narrates Candaules’ desire to show Gyges his wife in the next clause of the 
same sentence, the two clauses connected by complementary kai’s. The fact that 
Candaules wants Gyges to know his wife’s beauty, and insists that Gyges know it, along 
                                                 
31
 The nom- verb appears only once before in the Histories, where (in the Persian aitiology) the Greeks 
judge princess-theft to be an injustice. Without pressing the etymological connection too far (though I think 
it can be pressed pretty far before it breaks!), one might observe that the first ‘nom’ing anyone did in the 
Histories involved establishing inverse proportionality between relevantly similar states, and the second 
involved establishing inverse proportionality between relevantly similar women. 
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with the fact that Candaules’ wife is never named properly, but named only by reference 
to him, and first named as (and here it is tempting to see a subtle focalization in the 
reflexive pronoun) ‘the wife of himself (τῆς ἑωυτοῦ γυναικός)’ – all these factors 
contribute to the picture of Candaules’ wife as somehow derivative of Candaules, and his 
wife’s beauty as somehow, at least in Candaules’ own mind, reflective on Candaules 
himself. Candaules would evidently remain dissatisfied if his wife were not known to be 
the most beautiful. But he wants more than simple agreement: the knowledge that will 
satisfy him must be sensual, his wife must be known physically: Gyges already accepts 
Candaules’ testimony but Candaules will not be satisfied until Gyges sees her with his 
own eyes. Candaules contrasts the persuasive inefficacy of ‘supposing with ears’ with the 
persuasive efficacy of ‘seeing with eyes’, insisting that Gyges must consequently see her 
naked (Γύγη, οὐ γὰρ σε δοκέω πείθεσθαι μοι λέγοντι περὶ τοῦ εἴδεος τῆς 
γυναικός (ὦτα γὰρ τυγχάνει ἀνθρώποισι ἐόντα ἀπιστότερα ὀφθαλμῶν), 
ποίεε ὅκως ἐκείνην θεήσεαι γυμνήν). 
Candaules’ fateful command thus breaks down into two essential components: 
first, that Gyges look at her naked; and second, that in seeing her he recognize her as the 
most beautiful of all women. The second can be accomplished only by the first, for 
nothing but seeing will suffice to show her unique supremacy in beauty. Gyges has no 
objection to the judgment: indeed he already agrees that Candaules’ wife is the most 
beautiful, simply on the authority of Candaules’ word. Gyges instead objects only to the 
seeing: this is in fact the only thing that violates the Lydian maxim ‘look to one’s own 
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(σκοπέειν τινὰ τὰ ἑωυτοῦ)’ (1.8.4).32 The maxim describes a nomos: it is enforced by 
aidos (1.8.3), its contradiction is anomon (σέο δέομαι μὴ δέεσθαι ἀνόμων) (1.8.4), 
and the queen describes its violation as ou nomizomena (σε τὸν ἐμὲ γυμνήν 
θεησάμενον καὶ ποιήσαντα οὐ νομιζόμενα) (1.11.3). The Lydian nomos says 
nothing about ‘supposing another’s wife to be the most beautiful’, but emphatically 
prohibits the physical seeing of another’s wife naked, to such an extent that the ethical 
concept of aidos and the actual articles of clothing are fused (ἅμα δὲ κιθῶνι 
ἐκδυομένῳ συνεκδύεται καὶ τὴν αἰδῶ γυνή) (1.8.3).33 
From the point of view of nomos, the relevant Lydian nomos has made a 
‘sectional cut’ in Lydian society: σκοπέειν τινὰ τὰ ἑωυτοῦ, applied to this case, 
divides the members of the Lydian nomotic system into ‘those that may look at 
Candaules’ wife naked’ and ‘those that may not look at Candaules’ wife naked’. The first 
section has a definite quantity: only Candaules’ wife’s husband can call her ‘his own’ (the 
ἑωυτοῦ in Gyges’ quotation of the relevant nomos picks up the ἑωυτοῦ from ἠράσθη 
τῆς ἑωυτοῦ γυναικός at the logos’ opening), so this quantity is determinately two.34 
Candaules’ command attempts to increase that set’s membership to three.35 The offense, 
then, was a quantitative expansion; the queen’s tisis (1.11.3) is a contraction that restores 
                                                 
32
 Cairns 1996, 79-82 interestingly discusses the anomotic implications of seeing another’s wife naked in 
terms of the casting-off of the bride’s veil during many Greek wedding ceremonies. 
33
 Cf. Stahl 1968, 392; Konstan 1983, 12; Cairns 1996; Pelling 2006, 144. 
34
 Polyandry obviously has no place in Herodotus’ Lydia. 
35
 Herodotus’ presentation Gyges slightly shades into portraying him as representative of the entire Lydian 
community: Candaules wants to prove his wife is the most beautiful of all; he will be satisfied if Gyges 
alone sees and judges her to be so. 
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the number of persons permitted to see her naked to the definite quantity determined by 
the Lydian nomos.36 
Gyges’ argument against Candaules’ command is explicitly an appeal to nomos 
(1.8.4). Candaules does not understand; he patiently explains that Gyges need have no 
fear, since he will prevent the queen from inflicting tisis on him (1.9). Candaules 
responds as if Gyges were afraid of tisis, but Gyges had said nothing about tisis; Gyges 
had not even expressed fear, having justified his appeal to ‘look to one’s own’ by 
describing it as ‘fine things discovered by men of old’ (τὰ καλὰ ἀνθρώποισι 
ἐξεύρηται). The Lydian nomos is fine, and it divides the world into ‘those who may see 
the queen naked’ and the ‘those who may not see the queen naked’. Candaules does not 
even think in these nomotic, set-sectioning terms. Gyges has spoken only of the division 
as excellent through itself, not insofar as it avoids anything that might follow from 
violating it. But Candaules thinks that by blocking tisis he is obviating Gyges’ appeal to 
nomos: ‘take courage, for no harm will come to you’ (1.9.1). If this is adequate response 
to Gyges’ objection, then the Lydian nomos serves no other purpose, because it has no 
other dialectical force, than to help Lydians avoid the harm (βλάβος, at 1.9) that might 
follow from not looking to one’s own. For Candaules, the work of nomos is to protect 
against tisis; but why follow nomos when I, the king, whose contrivance will surely be 
successful (ἀρχήν γὰρ ἐγὼ μηχανήσομαι), can do the work of nomos for you? This 
argument – which must be Candaules’ if he thinks he is answering Gyges’ objection as 
Herodotus narrates it – considers nomos valuable only insofar as coercive, and therefore 
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 Cairns 1996, 80-81. 
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superfluous when some other equally strong coercive force appears. Candaules believes 
he possesses this power. Gyges does not dispute that Candaules can violate the nomos; he 
certainly can, because Gyges is not able to escape the royal command (ὃ μὲν δὴ ὡς οὐκ 
ἐδύνατο διαφυγεῖν (1.10.1)). But whereas Candaules in his royal power can command 
that the nomos be violated, he does not have the power to avoid the consequences of tisis, 
to which he reduced the work of nomos in his own argument. 
Candaules cares nothing for the content of the Lydian nomos; he looks only to its 
consequences. But the content of the Lydian nomos addresses exactly the situation to 
which Candaules is himself responding – namely, the circumstances in which phthonos 
arises. Candaules loved his wife (in the logos’ first clause); as soon as (in the second 
clause) he brought others into the picture, and compared her with them, he established his 
wife and others’ beauty in an inverse proportion; and so long as this inverse proportion 
obtained, he could not bear that anyone should consider his wife not the most beautiful. 
When the set of referents is two, Herodotus uses the ἠράσθη/ἐρασθεὶς verb; when 
Candaules phthonotically expands the set to many, the verb becomes ἐνόμιζέ/νομίζων, 
and immediately Candaules’ dissatisfaction with the inverse proportion becomes 
physicalized, visualized. Humans don’t believe their ears; they must see things in order to 
judge them the most beautiful (even before issuing his anomotic command, Candaules 
was praising his wife’s appearance in particular: τὸ εἶδος τῆς γυναικὸς 
ὑπερεπαινέων (1.8.1)). The set of the wife and the one that can call her ‘his own’ 
ought be identical to the set referred to by ἠράσθη/ἐρασθεὶς (Candaules and his wife); 
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if it were, then nothing problematic would have resulted.37 The Lydian nomos, in its 
specific content, commands that the set of ‘those who may see the queen naked’ be 
limited to one, and those that one plus the queen are the same as those referred to by 
ἠράσθη/ἐρασθεὶς. The juridical nomos turns out to be ‘physical’ – violating it does 
have harmful consequences, does produce tisis, and that’s a good reason for Candaules 
not to violate it – but even this obtains exactly in virtue of its juridicality: Candaules’ 
violation harms him because his wife also affirmed the Lydian nomos’ sectional cut. But 
Candaules is not interested in the nomos’ specific content, its set-division, at all.38 
The way Candaules contrives to do what he believes is the work of nomos – 
namely, to block tisis for ‘not looking to one’s own’ – is worth considering. First, he 
promises ‘to contrive so that she not learn that she has been seen by you’ (ἀρχήν γὰρ 
ἐγὼ μηχανήσομαι οὕτω ὥστε μηδέ μαθεῖν μιν ὀφθεῖσαν ὑπὸ σεῦ (1.9.1)). The 
verb for the wife’s action is μαθεῖν, a purely cognitive term without specifically 
physical connotation; the verb used for Gyges’ action is ὀφθεῖσαν, which is specifically 
physical. Later Candaules will tell Gyges to ‘make sure she doesn’t see you going 
through the door’ (σοὶ μελέτω τὸ ἐνθεῦτεν ὅκως μὴ σε ὄψεται ἰόντα διὰ θυρέων 
(1.9.3)). The wife’s projected action has shifted semantically from ‘learning’ to ‘seeing’, 
                                                 
37
 The mere presence of eros, especially when directed towards one’s wife, is sufficient to suggest 
something problematic; but within the narrative as Herodotus presents it, the eros alone did not cause the 
problem that the Candaules logos narrates. Even the notion that ‘eros toward one’s wife is unsuitable’ 
(which does not appear explicitly in the narrative, even as much as it may legitimately be read into the text) 
implies the same kind of division, if not the same specific division, that Candaules later violates in 
commanding Gyges to see his wife naked. The unsuitability of eros towards one’s wife, in other words, 
implies the division of Lydians into ‘those toward whom one may have eros’ and ‘those toward whom one 
may not have eros’. 
38
 Cf. Gray 1995, 187-88. 
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just as Candaules would not allow Gyges merely to suppose his wife was the most 
beautiful, but demanded that he see she was the most beautiful. By the time Candaules’ 
narrative has moved from ‘learning’ to ‘seeing’, his wife and Gyges are presented such 
that Gyges’ ‘being seen seeing’ is exactly what Candaules’ attempt to block tisis is 
prohibiting. Even as he seeks to ignore the ‘look to one’s own’ nomos, Candaules is 
implicitly conceding it, with deception making the relevant difference: if Gyges is seen 
not looking to his own, then Gyges will be harmed (by the queen’s tisis). 
The relation Candaules is attempting to establish between Gyges and his wife is 
thus straightforwardly asymmetric: Gyges must see the queen, but the queen must not see 
Gyges. The first is prohibited by nomos, the second (putatively) by Candaules’ 
contrivance; if Candaules’ contrivance had succeeded, then this asymmetric relation 
would have obtained. This is what Candaules is promising; Candaules is trying to prevent 
the situation from arising in which ‘the queen’s seeing Gyges’ makes ‘Gyges’ seeing the 
queen’ harmful to Gyges. But if Candaules fails, then inverse proportionality obtains 
between Gyges(-seeing) and the queen(-seeing): one party’s benefit necessarily entails 
the other’s harm; but this is also a phthonotic relation, a relation of ‘inverse 
proportionality’ between Gyges and the queen. The queen would be harmed by Gyges 
seeing her naked, because that is shameful (αἰσχύνην μεγάλην (1.10.3)); and Gyges 
would be harmed by the queen seeing him see her, because she would inflict tisis on him. 
This phthonotic relation arises when three circumstances obtain: (1) Gyges and the queen 
are both seeing each other; and (2) the queen is naked, and (3) Gyges is not the queen’s 
husband. The third is simple fact, the second is what Candaules wishes to display in order 
to show that she is the most beautiful, and the first is what Candaules is contriving to 
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prevent. Thus Candaules’ contrivance to block tisis is, in its specifics, an attempt to 
remove Gyges from a relation of ‘inverse proportionality’ with his wife. 
So far in this logos the ‘inverse proportionality’ characteristic of phthonotic 
circumstances has appeared twice: first, verbally, in καλλίστην; second, conceptually, 
in the relation between Gyges and Candaules’ wife. The first case presented Candaules as 
attempting to make himself (through his wife’s beauty) the enviable ‘best’; in the second 
case Candaules sought to remove Gyges, and through Gyges himself, from the phthonotic 
system that would, when perturbed, result in tisis. The queen’s restoration of the Lydian 
nomos’ ‘sectional cut’, the contraction of the set of ‘those who may see the queen naked’, 
is the nomotic system’s response to such a perturbation; it arises when ‘inverse 
proportionality’ between humans obtains. Candaules has attempted, in both cases, to 
master this ‘inverse proportionality’, to move persons in and out of phthonotic relation at 
will. He fails, and dies; but he fails only because his wife sees Gyges.39 
The queen’s tisis takes phthonotic form as well, but more deeply than Candaules 
had imagined: she offers Gyges the choice between killing Candaules or being killed 
himself (1.11.2). Candaules’ command would result in some measure of harm to either 
Gyges (if he disobeyed) or his wife (if Gyges obeyed); the queen’s command must result 
in death to one or the other. In offering Gyges the ‘kill or be killed’ choice, the queen 
radicalizes the ‘inverse proportionality’ between Gyges and Candaules to the greatest 
possible extent: now even Candaules’ very existence redounds to Gyges’ non-existence. 
The narrative puts this strikingly: ‘[Gyges] chose to remain existing (αἱρέεται αὐτὸς 
                                                 
39
 Women are often seen as ‘guardians of nomos/culture’, in Greek and other contexts; see e. g. Collier 
1974, Rosaldo 1974, McHardy 2004. For women in Herodotus specifically, see Dewald 1981, esp. 119n30; 
Lateiner 1989, 135-40; Van der Veen 1996, 23-52; and most recently Blok 2002, which surveys the field 
and provides a useful synthesis. 
24 
 
περιεῖναι)’ (1.11.4). From here the narrative immediately turns to the murder-plot, 
without saying anything like ‘so Gyges decided to kill Candaules’, or ‘Gyges decided to 
kill Candaules so as to stay alive’. Gyges’ choice to live does not merely result in his 
killing Candaules; it is identical to his choice to kill Candaules. This profound 
contradiction between Gyges’ and Candaules’ acts of being follows from the inflexible 
determinateness of the size of the ‘those who may see the queen naked’ set40 – prescribed 
by the Lydian nomos, enforced by the queen.41 
Thus the first authoritative logos in the Histories concludes in an absolute 
radicalization of this ‘inverse proportionality’ between one and another’s good. In the 
beginning Candaules could not endure that someone should not think his wife the most 
beautiful; at the end, because of Candaules’ anomotic pursuit of this phthonotic desire, 
Gyges cannot endure that Candaules should remain existing. Candaules’ eros began the 
logos, and the queen’s phthonoticized tisis ended Candaules life. At first, eros motivated 
Candaules to judge his wife the most beautiful, but only eros in conjunction with 
phthonos motivated him to violate the nomotic division. The violation was an expansion 
of the nomos-determined section: here where eros and expansion both first appear, eros 
alone is not sufficient to generate expansion. 
This conjunction will remain important throughout the Herodotean narrative. 
Moreover, the first explicitly cited nomos divides Lydian society according to ‘who may 
see’: a few may (determinately two), the rest may not. Sight will figure prominently 
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 See also Cairns 1996, 82n26. 
41
 The queen’s active role is paralleled in the Masistes logos (9.108-13), as Wolff 1964, Flory 1987, 35-36, 
Gray 1995, 189-92, and Blok 2002, 230-32 point out. 
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throughout the narrative42, but here, where it first appears, it serves as the ‘dividing line’ 
according to which nomos sections society. Third, the queen emphasizes the close tie 
between Candaules’ royal power and ‘not looking to one’s own’ when she describes 
Gyges’ action of seeing her naked as ‘obeying Candaules in everything (πάντα 
πειθόμενος Κανδαύλῃ)’ (1.11.2). The essential conflict between unlimited monarchy, 
which allows the king to do whatever he wants, and nomos, which establishes definite 
limits to sections of society – to violate which limits generates the ‘inverse 
proportionality’ to which phthonos will inevitably respond – will become increasingly 
important throughout the Histories. It appears for the first time here, in the queen’s own 
mouth as she puts Gyges’ and Candaules’ lives in inverse proportion, plotting to inflict 
her tisis on the king.
                                                 
42
 See the discussion of the Croesus logos below. 
  
 
3. The Croesus logos: Solon, Amasis, and the phthonos of the gods 
 
 As Herodotus tells it, the Candaules logos is prefatory to the Croesus logos: the 
Herodotean narrator is interested in Candaules especially insofar as Candaules is 
Croesus’ predecessor, and Croesus was ‘the first to commit injustices against the Greeks 
(ὸν δὲ οἶδα αὐτὸς πρῶτον ὑπάρξαντα ἀδίκων ἔργων ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας)’ (1.5.3). 
The authoritative affirmation is explicitly distinguished from the preceding Persian and 
Phoenician accounts, and Croesus’ introduction is the narrative statement that sets the 
‘vouched for’ and ‘merely related’ logoi apart.43 
 The two logoi are thus as closely related as possible within the narrative 
presentation of the Lydian world. As will be seen shortly, both characters’ downfalls 
have something to do with boundary-violations; but the boundaries violated are formally 
quite different. The difference is described partly by distinction between ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ perturbations to the relevant system. 44 Gyges was no foreigner; he killed 
Candaules because of Candaules’ attempt to expand the nomos-determined set within the 
Lydian sociopolitical system.45 But Cyrus is no Lydian (and so cannot possibly be 
enforcing a Lydian nomos), and yet Croesus’ fall has surely something to do with his 
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 See De Jong 2004, 102-7. 
44
 The parallel discussion of feminine/barbarian ‘otherness’ in Gray 1995 offers an example of the kind of 
parallel intrastate/interstate movements modeled by and responded to within a phthonotic system. 
45
 Gyges’ regicide, it turns out, was not altogether justifiable, even though the nomos demanded the set’s 
contraction – because Gyges was a slave (1.91). 
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own, dramatically culpable failure.46 A kind of phthonotic desire motivated Candaules to 
expand the relevant set, and radicalized ‘inverse proportionality’, enacted in the queen’s 
tisis, motivated Gyges to recontract the set and kill the king. But Croesus’ phthonos does 
not motivate anyone to kill him (Cyrus does not envy Lydian wealth, but Croesus fears 
Persian power47), and yet his stubborn, blind refusal to admit that anyone else could be as 
blessed as he – thus explicitly establishing the universally quantified ‘inverse 
proportionality’ just seen in Candaules’ attitude toward his wife’s beauty – is exactly the 
hamartia around which Herodotus centers Croesus’ dramatic arc. The conjunction of 
these two kinds of aitiology – internal and external – marks the Croesus logos as the true 
beginning of the complex, authoritative Herodotean inquiry, as Herodotus himself openly 
affirms at 1.5.3. 
The ‘internal/external’ distinction is made explicit, and narrated in the 
storyteller’s memorable style, in the encounter between Croesus and Solon ‘when Sardis 
was at its peak of wealth (Σάρδις ἀκμαζούσας πλούτῳ)’ (1.29.1). Here the narrative 
picks up a rhetorical flourish from the opening of book 1 – the ‘sudden appearance of an 
incalculably important figure’: there Paris (incalculably important to mythical history), 
here Solon (incalculably important to political history). The ‘important figure’ brings the 
pre-existing force of his own character to the narrative, serving for Herodotus as the 
narrative analogue to Aristotle’s ‘artless proof’ in rhetoric (Rhetoric 1355b35ff): 
Herodotus doesn’t need to convince you of their importance by means of his narrative 
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 See esp. Sheffield 1973, 5-161; Moles 1996, 259-284; Blösel 2001, 180; Vannicelli 2001, 213ff. 
47
 Pelling 2006, 153 and sources in n46. 
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art.48 But while Paris does only one thing in the Herodotean narrative, and that action is 
not materially differently to his standard action in the epic cycle, Solon carries his 
‘narrative baggage’ with additional Herodotean chronological background, some 
mentioned right away, and a little more given in the next book (2.177). 
At 1.29, Solon has just given his laws to Athens; at 1.30, he goes first to Amasis 
at Egypt and then to Croesus at Sardis. The chronological analepsis is a narrative 
prolepsis, here pointing to Herodotus’ only explication of what Solon did at Egypt 
(2.177). During his visit to Egypt, Solon took an Egyptian nomos that Amasis had 
originally made, and gave it to the Athenians (Σόλων δὲ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος λαβὼν ἐξ 
Αἰγύπτου τοῦτον τὸν νόμον Ἀθηναίοισι ἔθετο).49 This is the only law of Solon 
explicitly mentioned in the Histories, and it deserves further examination. 
 Herodotus introduces the law as a cap-stone to Amasis’ achievements in Egypt, 
beginning 2.177 with a laudatory summation of his reign: ‘it is said that while Amasis 
was king Egypt at that time became the most blessed (ἐπ᾽ Ἀμάσιος δὲ βασιλέος 
λέγεται Αἴγυπτος μάλιστα δὴ τότε εὐδαιμονῆσαι)’. The account of Amasis’ law 
follows an explanatory expansion of ‘most blessed’ to include both natural and human 
phenomena (καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ τῇ χώρῃ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς χώρης 
τοῖσι ἀνθρώποισι), and a definite quantitative account of Egypt’s population at the 
time (καὶ πόλις ἐν αὐτῇ γενέσθαι τὰς ἁπάσας τότε δισμυρίας τὰς οἰκεομένας). 
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 Herodotus strengthens the emphasis anyway: ‘καὶ δὴ καὶ Σόλων ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναῖος’ (1.29). 
49
 The nomos/thesmos distinction is not helpful here, although Solon’s reforms are indeed more properly 
called thesmoi (cf. McGlew 1996, 106), both because Herodotus does not distinguish Amasis and Solon as 
lawgivers, although their real political offices were extremely different, and also because, in any case, the 
word nomos is used explicitly. 
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No causal relation between Amasis’ policies and the state’s prosperity is strictly entailed 
by the text, but the two are immediately juxtaposed, and the paratactic Herodotus often 
shows consequence by mere juxtaposition.50 In any case the next sentence follows up on 
the quantitative ‘twenty thousand’ accounting by offering a carefully phrased formulation 
of Amasis’ (later Solon’s) law: ‘the establisher of this law for the Egyptians was Amasis: 
that each year every one of the Egyptians [must] show to his nomarch whence he lived 
(νόμον τε Αἰγυπτίοισι τόνδε Ἄμασις ἐστὶ ὁ καταστήσας, ἀποδεικνύναι ἔτεος 
ἑκάστου τῷ νομάρχῃ πάντα τινὰ Αἰγυπτίων ὅθεν βιοῦται)’. The formula is 
interesting in several ways: first, the verb signifying the action commanded is 
ἀποδεικνύναι, the word Herodotus chose at 1.1 to describe his own text; second, the 
official to whom each citizen is accountable is the ‘nomarch’, the official in charge of the 
nomoi; and third, the ‘thing that must be shown’ is ‘whence [each] lived’. Amasis’ nomos 
does not prescribe, or proscribe, any particular activity determined by the Egyptian 
sociopolitical structure; it requires instead a showing of the whole set of each citizen’s 
activity within the structure, so that each citizen’s bios is nomotically accounted for.51 
Thus by Amasis’ law each citizen is required formally to locate himself in the 
Egyptian sociopolitical structure. Whence each citizen lives, and hence how each citizen 
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 Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1409a; Brubacher 1902; Immerwahr 1969, 7-15, 46-78; Lang 1984, ; Bakker 2006, 
93-95 and passim. 
51
 The phrase ὅθεν βιοῦται implies the society’s interest in the foundations of each citizen’s living. The 
necessity of such an accounting suggests Agamben’s technical distinction between ‘mere life’ (zoe) and 
‘political life’ (bios); but Amasis’ establishment of a nomos designed to relate the two (i.e., to prove that 
one is living acceptably to the community) by casuistic self-accounting seems partly to avert the danger of 
‘exceptionality’ insofar as the nomos exactly does not prescribe anything but casuistic self-accounting 
itself. The casuistic nature of this self-accounting is of course not necessarily egalitarian, and the 
importance of particularized self-accountings  suggests a basic sociopolitical order far more complex than 
simple egalitarianism; for some notes in this direction re. Solon’s family laws, see Lape 2002. 
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relates to other members of society, must be accounted for. The narrative relates this to 
Egyptian prosperity by paratactic suggestion; the next clause brings the prosperity-
generating law to Greece, for ‘Solon the Athenian took this law from Egypt and 
established it for the Athenians’ (Σόλων δὲ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος λαβὼν ἐξ Αἰγύπτου 
τοῦτον τὸν νόμον Ἀθηναίοισι ἔθετο)’ (2.177.2). Herodotus follows this factual note 
with another highly positive evaluation, observing that ‘the Athenians are always bound 
by [this law] because it is faultless (τῷ ἐκεῖνοι ἐς αἰεὶ χρέωνται ἐόντι ἀμώμῳ 
νόμῳ)’. As the law benefited Egypt, so also it benefited the Athenians, when Solon the 
Athenian gave it to them. 
This is the chronological background to Solon’s arrival at Croesus’ court, 
analeptically introduced at 1.30. The narrative first introduced Solon as merely one of 
‘the sophistai from Greece’ (οἱ πάντες ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος σοφισταί), but merely being 
‘sophos’ does not exhaust his importance to the Athenians, nor, therefore, his imported 
impact on the narrative. Solon’s ‘artless weight’ impacts the narrative generally as law-
giver at 1.29.1, and his law-giving is specified to this law of Amasis’ at 2.177. Thus 
insofar as Solon appears in the Histories as law-giver, he appears as having taken a 
‘flawless’ law from Amasis, which ensured prosperity by requiring every citizen to 
account for his livelihood to a public official, whose title is nomarch. Herodotus praises 
this ‘self-accounting’ requirement; but how does it work? The narrative affirms that self-
accounting produces prosperity; this is its effect, but what is its proper ergon, in virtue of 
which it brings about these great benefits? 
The conceptual complex introduced in earlier logoi gives the answer. Certain 
divisions of society generate phthonos; others do not, and the good law-giver, and hence 
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the good nomoi, divide society such that phthonos does not obtain.52 Under 
Amasis’/Solon’s law, each individual’s self-accounting to the nomarch ensures that the 
individual’s bios, his life in society, is arranged nomotically, i.e., respecting the ‘sectional 
cuts’ made by the relevant nomoi. This prevents ‘inverse proportionality’ from obtaining, 
and hence prevents the material precondition of phthonos. This is consistent with the 
general thrust of Solon’s laws: within a non-monarchical state, the phthonotic response to 
inverse proportionality is stasis53; and it is a commonplace accepted as far back as 
Solon’s own poetry, that the office of legislator was assigned to Solon in order that he 
might give such laws as would stop present and block future city-sickening stasis.54 If 
each citizen, following the Amasian-Solonian law, successfully accounts for his living to 
the public nomarch, then in the public theater he will not appear in violation of nomotic 
‘sectional cuts’. Amasis’ law prevents phthonos by blocking ‘inverse proportionality’, 
which it accomplishes by ensuring that each citizen is located within his or her own 
section. Each citizen has a place in society, which each society’s nomoi determine; the 
law of ‘casuistic self-accounting’ securely locates each citizen in his proper, nomos-
respecting and hence phthonos-avoiding place.55 
                                                 
52
 Cf. the discussion of Solon’s reforms in McGlew 1996, 87-123. 
53
 Cf. Darius at 3.82: ‘αὐτὸς γὰρ ἕκαστος βουλόμενος κορυφαῖος εἶναι γνώμῃσί τε νικᾶν ἐς 
ἔχθεα μεγάλα ἀλλήλοισι ἀπικνέονται, ἐξ ὧν στάσιες ἐγγίνονται’. 
54
 The monarchical state does not produce stasis only because stasis is a technical term denoting 
‘phthonotic correction’ in a society constituted in a particular way. The analogous corrective responding in 
a monarchical constitution is what I will be discussing below, treating Persian monarchs’ attempts to avoid 
phthonos. 
55
 The law needs to be understood in the context of Herodotus’ whole picture of Amasis. In fact Amasis is 
so conscious of divine phthonos (τὸ θεῖον ἐπισταμένῳ ὡς ἔστι φθονερόν (3.40.2)) that he grows 
worried as soon as he learns of nothing more than Polykrates’ good fortune (3.40.1). Immediately he 
advises Polykrates to give up what is dearest to him (3.40.4), and eventually, fearing divine phthonos, 
breaks off his friendship with Polykrates (which he marked with special offerings (2.182.2)), completely 
32 
 
Thus Herodotus presents Solon nomothetes. He appears at 1.29 carrying this 
‘artless baggage’, and insofar as this introduction gives background to the narrative 
following, the Croesus logos must be read with the colossal figure of Solon-nomothetes, 
phthonos-avoider, lurking at its narratological edge. Following his introduction to 
Croesus’ palace, the first concrete thing Solon does is to look, at Croesus’ bidding, at ‘all 
[Croesus’] great and blessed things (ἐπεδείκνυσαν πάντα ἐόντα μεγάλα τε καὶ 
ὄλβια)’ (1.30.1). The narrator has just noted that Solon’s purpose in leaving Athens, and 
hence coming to Egypt and Sardis, was, first, to prevent the Athenians from escaping the 
laws he set for them, to which they bound themselves by oath; and, second, ‘for seeing’ 
(καὶ τῆς θεωρίης).’56 The first thing Solon does at Sardis is indeed ‘seeing’, but the 
‘seeing’ is narrated by an active verb taking Croesus as subject, the first thing Croesus 
does to Solon (ἐπεδείκνυσαν). The deik- root is the same as Herodotus’ description of 
his project at 1.1 (ἀπόδεξις), and the single verb appearing in Herodotus’ formulation of 
                                                                                                                                                 
dissociating himself from the Samian tyrant as soon as he hears that Polycrates’ ring has been returned 
(πέμψας δέ οἱ κήρυκα ἐς Σάμον διαλύεσθαι ἔφη τὴν ξεινίην (3.43.2)). Amasis’ attitude toward 
Polykrates could hardly be more Solonic in its acute awareness of the phthonos of the gods. Herodotus 
consistently describes Amasis in this way (cf. 2.162, 2.172-174) even from Amasis’ accession, which he 
accomplished by defeating the paradigmatically arrogant rival Apries, who believes that even divinity 
could not halt his kingship (2.169.2). (For Amasis as the major exception to Herodotus’ king-type, see 
Lattimore 1939, 32. For the notion that Polykrates’ rule, not his ring, is what Polykrates needs to give up in 
order to escape divine phthonos – because his rule is the most important thing to him – see Van der Veen 
1996, 6-22.) 
56
 Here the narrative voice offers ‘for seeing’ as a true reason for Solon’s departure. At 1.29.1, Solon had 
himself offered ‘for seeing’ as an excuse for his departure (κατά θεωρίης πρόφασιν), when in fact he 
wished simply not to be forced to repeal his laws. Herodotus uses the same word in both places, in the same 
case, though with different uses of the genitive. This coincidence between pretense and reality may speak 
to nothing more than Solon’s, or perhaps generally Greek, predilection for theoria – as if its plausibility as 
reason for self-exile could scarcely be questioned; and even when it did not originally motivate the self-
exile, yet when the opportunity for theoria presents itself, even the most self-controlled Solon cannot resist. 
But given Herodotus’ general awareness of the importance of criticizing historical accounts, including 
individuals’ accounts of their own motivation, and in a narrative context in which, analeptically, the 
Amasian-Solonian ‘self-accounting’ nomos is about to be mentioned, it is hard to avoid wondering whether 
something more about theoria is intended by the text. 
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the Amasian-Solonian ‘self-accounting’ requirement at 2.177 (ἀποδεικνύναι).57 From 
the point of view of the ‘self-accounting’ nomos, Croesus is now showing Solon what his 
bios is. But instead of offering an account of whence his bios comes, so as to prove that 
his bios does not contradict others’, Croesus instead expects that this ‘showing’ will 
prove to Solon that Croesus is ‘the most blessed of men’ (1.30.2, again repeating 
θεωρίης). 
The contrast between Solon’s and Croesus’ use of deixis could not be more direct. 
What Croesus wants from deixis is ‘to be seen to be more blessed than all others’; what 
Solon and Amasis require of deixis is ‘to be seen to be living nomotically’. Croesus is 
phthnoticizing deixis: he puts ‘himself’ and ‘all’ into a relation of inverse proportionality, 
like Candaules in the last logos vis-à-vis his wife. Solon and Amasis are deploying deixis 
along an exactly opposite sociopolitical vector, using it against phthonos, seeking to 
block phthonos by ‘showing’ to ‘all’ (represented by the nomarch) that the bios of each 
citizen does not redound to others’ harm. Like Candaules’, Croesus’ deixis is solely 
physical: as Candaules expected nothing but physical sight to establish that his wife was 
more beautiful than all other women, here Croesus expects that physical sight with 
nothing added will suffice to establish that he is more blessed than all other men. Gyges 
thinks that sight is not necessary, and Solon thinks that sight is not enough.58 The 
                                                 
57
 For an extended discussion of Herodotean apodeixis see Thomas 2000, 249-69. 
58
 Cf. Baragwanath 2008, 127n20, citing Montiglio 2005, 132: ‘Croesus mistakes Solon’s theoria (1.30.1) 
for the less involved and intelligent theasthai (1.86.5, i.e ‘watching’ as opposed to ‘contemplating’.’ 
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difference for both is nomos: for Gyges, the Lydian nomos that prohibits not ‘looking to 
one’s own’; for Solon, the content of his speeches that contradicts Croesus’ claim.59 
Croesus, however, does not understand Solon’s stories of Tellus and 
Cleobis/Biton, and angrily rejects Solon’s affirmation that these ‘private’ Greeks are 
more blessed than Croesus. At the close of Solon’s second tale, Croesus’ and Solon’s 
disagreement over ‘what constitutes happiness’ remains fundamentally intact: Croesus 
believes that happiness comes from supremacy in wealth; Solon believes that happiness 
has something to do with communities, divinities, and ends.60 So far Croesus and Solon 
simply disagree about how to measure happiness; Solon has not actually refuted Croesus’ 
claim. Croesus may be excused, then, for failing to understand why Solon does not 
consider him the most blessed – for Croesus and Solon are measuring blessedness 
according to different metra. Now, these metra differ in many ways, but one of them is 
that ‘best’, on Croesus’ metron, is measured by simple quantitative superiority: ‘that 
human is most blessed who has the greatest quantity of wealth’. For Croesus, blessedness 
is identical to ‘greatness’ along a certain (chrematistic) dimension; while Solon’s calculus 
of blessedness has at least three dimensions, and their geometric relation61 is far from 
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 Both of Solon’s stories emphasize the essential dependence of each individual’s blessedness on his 
society: Tellus is blessed partly because he came to a glorious end, and this end was glorious inasmuch as it 
came during (victorious) battle for Athens; Cleobis and Biton are blessed in their end also, which the god 
gave them in response to their mother’s prayer (which they merited by serving her at a public festival). 
Both individuals also are honored by the city, and since Solon’s stories are supposed to show their 
blessedness, these honors must play a part in their blessedness also. All three individuals won their 
blessedness through military service, on the one hand, or filial piety, on the other; and both military service 
and filial piety, in the modes in which the Athenians and Argives conceive them, are matters of nomos, 
whether customary only or formally legal also.  
60
 This disagreement is the central theme of Crane 1996. 
61
 By this I mean that Croesus thinks that blessedness can be ‘graphed’ easily (and linearly), while for 
Solon, even if such an account were possible, it would have to be given in some extremely non-obvious 
way. 
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simple. It is exactly at this point in the narrative (1.32.1) that Croesus grows angry with 
Solon’s judgments, and demands that he justify the standards according to which he has 
‘thrown away (ἀπέρριπται)’ Croesus’ happiness (εὐδαιμονίη). Solon’s justification 
presents the Histories’ first extended treatment of limits, deity, and phthonos, and turns 
Croesus’ ‘quantitivism’ on its rhetorical head by offering a detailed quantitative analysis 
as a conclusive argument in support of ‘looking to the end’. It turns out that Croesus is 
wrong because, first, human bios has a limit; and second – a point that is somewhat 
obscurely related to the first – because of the phthonos of the gods.62 
The first verb in Solon’s reply (1.32.1) relates Croesus’ question to Solon as 
questioned (ἐπειρωτᾷς), and characterizes Solon as ‘knowing that the god is envious 
and troublesome in all things (ἐπιστάμενόν με τὸ θεῖον πᾶν ἐὸν φθονερόν τε καὶ 
ταραχῶδες)’. Thus insofar as Solon is responding to Croesus’ question, he presents 
himself as having knowledge of universal divine envy, and its ‘troublesome’ impact on 
human affairs (ἀνθρωπηίων πρηγμάτων πέρι). This is the first appearance in the 
Histories of the ‘envy of the gods’; it is also the first mention of divinity within a 
theoretical account, and claims universal scope. The first adjective describes a fact about 
the gods in general (πᾶν ἐὸν φθονερόν); the second relates this fact to humans 
(ταραχῶδες..ἀνθρωπηίων πρηγμάτων πέρι). This is an explicit statement of a 
supremely important principle in the Histories, the principle this paper aims to 
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 For relevant bibliography see Harrison 2003, 158n52. 
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explicate.63 For in terms of the systemic ‘sectional cuts’ that determine the ‘inverse 
proportionalities’ to which phthonos responds: the gods’ phthonotic relation to human 
beings makes the whole human-divine world the system in which the gods respond 
phthonotically.64 
Solon’s relation of this divine phthonos to ‘human matters’ confirms that humans 
and gods are related within the system of the world such that ‘inverse proportionality’ can 
obtain between them.65 This system is ‘humanity and divinity’, and Solon explicitly 
declares that it is phthonotic (φθονερόν). Insofar as the system is phthonotic, it is 
considered as divided, since phthonos responds to the violation of the ‘sectional cuts’ that 
make one division’s benefit redound to the other’s harm. But ‘the world considered as 
divided’ is precisely the kosmos, apportioned according to moira, which the gods, and 
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 Herodotus’ general agreement with Solon is argued in Stahl 1975, 5; Redfield 1985, 102; Shapiro 1994, 
1996, and 2000; Moles 1996, 259-84; Harrison 2000, 31-63; Fisher 2002, 201; Harrison 2003, 158ff; 
Pelling 2003, 143. Lang 1984, 61; Kurke 1999, 148-149, and Pelling 2003, 143 argue in favor of a more 
complex attitude toward Herodotus’ use of Solon’s wisdom, but no-one doubts that the Herodotean 
narrative more or less bears out Solon’s claims, at least in the most important respects. 
64
 Ranulf 1933-34 argues that this is a foundational principle of all Greek notions of justice. 
65
 This ‘relevant similarity’ implied by the common divine-human membership in the cosmic set seems 
intriguingly at odds with the Persian disbelief in the Greek notion of human-divine likeness (οὐκ 
ἀνθρωποφυέας ἐνόμισαν τοὺς θεοὺς κατά περ οἱ Ἕλληνες εἶναι) (1.131.1). But this touches on 
the Persian ethnography, which, though in many cases profoundly relevant. The Persian division, or rather 
indivision, of Asia and Europe; their wine-drinking and drunken/sober deliberations, which, according to 
the Ethiopian king, implies comparative weakness, and hence in the context of the ‘semi-divinized’ 
Ethiopians suggests wine as an effective if non-actual violation of the divine-human boundary; the 
Persians’ phthonotic supposition that they are the best of all humans, and simultaneous (and hence at least 
purportedly consistent) maximally free adoption of foreign nomoi; their juridical quantitative calculation of 
benefits and harms caused – all of these touch on the Persians’ peculiar attitude toward divine-human 
relations, and their special focus on quantity, but the subject of Persian ethnography is far too large and too 
complex to discuss here. A fuller discussion of the ‘nomotic systems’ discussed in this paper would relate 
domestic and foreign relations more fully, and hence not only through individual stories, but also through 
Herodotus’ ethnographic digressions. 
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especially Zeus, are essentially bound to maintain.66 Thus for Solon, ‘humans’ are one 
part of the kosmos, and ‘gods’ are another; and the gods maintain the ‘sectional cut’ that 
divides the parts by responding to human violations phthonotically. 
But the universalization of divine phthonos toward humans further affirms that 
the limits of the finite set treated by divine phthonos are identical to the limits of the 
world. Thus Solon’s justification of his own metron of blessedness, deployed against 
Croesus’ challenge, presents this divine ‘phthonotic system’ as analogous to the human 
sociopolitical systems, intrastate and interstate, already introduced in the earlier 
Herodotean narrative. The divided sets that include the gods, and the divided sets that do 
not include the gods, maintain systemic homeostasis by means of phthonos, responding to 
systemic perturbations caused by violations of boundaries between humans and other 
humans (both interstate and intrastate), or between humans and gods. But it is not 
possible to exit the set of the kosmos, for everything that exists is its member by 
definition. 
The identification of the external limits of the ‘divine phthonotic system’ with the 
limits of the world has deep implications for all attempts at ‘set-expansion’, at least one 
of which we have already seen. Within the Lydian nomotic system, Candaules’ wife 
maintained the boundary determined by ‘look to one’s own’ by killing Candaules its 
violator, thus reducing the set of ‘those who may see the queen naked’ back to its nomos-
determined quantity. The weakness of this kind of phthonotic response is that it can 
respond only within a given nomotic system, a system of ‘sectional cuts’. But Solon’s 
location of the gods within such a system, and the identification of this system with the 
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 The gods’ (or at least Apollo’s) subordination to moira is mentioned at 1.91.2 (οὐκ οἷόν τε ἐγίνετο 
παραγαγεῖν μοίρας), explaining the vengeance visited upon Gyges’ descendants for the regicide. 
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kosmos, makes this weakness irrelevant. Later I will treat imperial expansion as another 
kind of ‘set-expansion’, designed to avoid phthonos from within a given sociopolitical 
system. But the presence of a set that contains all other sets (the kosmos) dooms any such 
attempt to failure, so long as the set-expansion in fact violates one of the ‘sectional cuts’ 
that divide one state from another.67 As we will see toward the end of this paper, Xerxes 
attempts to take control of even this ‘set of all other sets’, setting his imperial sights on an 
empire whose extension is ‘everything the sun touches’ (7.8c.2). He fails; for even 
Xerxes comes up against limits. 
All this is presented only in embryo here, articulated by Solon in theoretical 
justification after two relatively simple illustrations in narrative. In this way Solon in his 
stories is doing the same kind of thing Herodotus does in his Histories. Solon’s stories 
offer a far richer and more complex picture than the justificatory theory presented in all 
its theoretical dryiness. Moreover, the theory is offered only when Croesus refuses to 
listen to the stories. But even within his dialectical response Solon cannot resist telling a 
story – here, not the story of any particular individual’s life, but rather the story of every 
individual’s life, in respect of those things that all human lives share.68 
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 Themistocles (8.109.3) claims that just such a ‘sectional cut’ does in fact divide Europe from Asia, and 
attributes the maintenance of this boundary to the phthonos of the gods (ἀλλὰ θεοί τε καὶ ἥρωες, οἳ 
ἐφθόνησαν ἄνδρα ἕνα τῆς τε Ἀσίης καὶ τῆς Εὐρώπης βασιλεῦσαι). He goes on in the next clause 
to accuse Xerxes, inasmuch as he is violating this boundary, of ‘making sacred and profane things the same 
(ὃς τά τε ἱρὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἐν ὁμοίῳ ἐποιέετο)’. The violation of the divinely-guarded interstate 
boundaries is thus also a violation of the divine-human boundary, and hence engenders a divine phthonotic 
response. 
68
 Solon presents his arithmetical accounting at 1.32 as ‘the boundary of life for the human (οὖρον τῆς 
ζόης ἀνθρώπῳ)’ (1.32.2); he sums up the account by observing that ‘the human being is altogether 
chance (πᾶν ἐστὶ ἄνθρωπος συμφορή)’ (1.32.4). The singular ἀνθρώπῳ/ἄνθρωπος , in conjunction 
with its application to Croesus (as well as the πολλοὶ μὲν…πολλοὶ δὲ  at 1.32.5), imply that Solon’s 
calculation is a generic account: Solon here is speaking narratively, not syllogistically, about ‘everyman’. 
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Now immediately after stating the general theory of ‘divine-human membership 
in a phthonotic system’, Solon has merely made explicit the metaphysical claim 
(universal divine phthonos) implied by his presentation of the Tellus/Cleobis/Biton 
stories as refutations of Croesus’ phthonotic claim. Croesus might still refuse to 
acknowledge this claim; again, Solon has merely asserted it, without argument. The rest 
of the chapter narrates Solon’s argument, beginning with the connecting γὰρ at 1.32.2. 
This sentence is connected with the next by another γὰρ, so this sentence reads as a 
summation of the argument that follows. The proof of the claim is presented, in the first 
γὰρ clause, as an empirically determinable proposition, with empirical results presented 
as evidence in the second. The first sentence asserts that ‘in [the long time of life, about 
to be calculated] there are many things one does not wish to see, and many also that one 
does not wish to suffer (ἐν γὰρ τῷ μακρῷ χρόνῳ πολλὰ μὲν ἐστὶ ἰδεῖν τὰ μή τις 
ἐθέλει, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ παθεῖν)’. Solon offers this as proof of divine phthonos; again, 
taking Solon’s rhetoric seriously, this means that the existence and relevant operation of 
divine phthonos is proved by the ‘appearance’ and ‘suffering’ of ‘many things one does 
not wish’. At the beginning of his justification Solon had extended divine phthonos as 
evidence for Tellus/Cleobis/Biton’s blessedness; here the relevance of divine phthonos is 
given as its explicit opposition, in many cases (πολλὰ μὲν… πολλὰ δὲ καὶ), to human 
desire. 
The precise significance of this particular Solonian formulation of the ‘law of 
divine phthonos’ is crucial for relating divine phthonos to human phthonos. For the kind 
of opposition offered by any phthonotic response is the opposition of limiting, within the 
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relevant finite set. Thus divine phthonos opposes human desire by limiting it within the 
kosmos, responding to the ‘inverse proportionality’ established by human attempts to 
expand the human division of the universe. Now in Solon’s formulation, this 
phthonotically-preserved ‘limiting’ is presented precisely as opposed to ‘τὰ τις ἐθέλει’. 
This phrase, describing what divine phthonos opposes, is the ‘unlimiting’ expression of 
human will: humans cannot do whatever they want because divine phthonos will stop 
them. In the set of the kosmos, divine phthonos opposes unlimited human desire. But the 
Herodotean narrative includes another, similar expression of unlimited human desire; and 
this time the set is the Persian state. At 3.31, when Cambyses conceives an erotic desire 
for his sister, the Persian ‘royal judges’ tell him that there exists a Persian nomos 
permitting the king to do ‘τὸ ἂν βούληται’ (3.31.4). I will discuss this passage at length 
later (in chapter 4), but for now the strong verbal likeness between Solon’s formulation of 
‘what makes Croesus wrong’ and this formulation of the Persian monarchical nomos 
should be noted: the kind of thing that divine phthonos opposes, is exactly the kind of 
thing that Persian ‘unlimited’ monarchical nomos permits. The conceptual overlap lies in 
the potential ‘unlimitedness’ of human desire, which Solon takes generically, but 
Herodotus, in Cambyses’ case, contextualizes to the erotic. But already at 1.32, 
Candaules’ and Croesus’ shared emphasis on physical seeing materially relates Croesus’ 
obsession with chremata to Candaules’ eroticism – whether or not Croesus’ phthonotic 
claims to supreme blessedness can itself be taken as erotically possessive (in Croesus’ 
case, of wealth). 
After this expression of the limits placed by divine phthonos on the 
accomplishment of human desire, Solon’s calculation of the number of days in a human 
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life (1.32.3) explicates and definitely determines the repeated πολλὰ that indefinitely 
quantified the ‘things that happen that humans don’t want’ mentioned in evidence of 
universal divine phthonos. Croesus wanted a definite quantity (of wealth) to prove his 
claim to supreme blessedness; Solon gives him a definite quantity (of days) to refute it. 
Where Croesus places wealth, Solon places days; but the set of days, not wealth, is 
irrefutably finite, because humans are not immortal. Death is exactly the ‘sectional cut’ 
that divides humans and gods69; Croesus is wrong because death is a human fact.70 But 
the narrative presents Solon’s argument as if his quantitative explication of ‘death is a 
fact’ explains ‘divine phthonos makes many unwanted things happen to humans’. Then 
the division preserved by divine phthonos is exactly the division in virtue of which gods 
and humans are kept apart. The limit that divine phthonos enforces on human desire is 
ultimately the limit of human life. Solon’s final summation of his refusal to grant Croesus 
what he asks (1.32.5-9) is filled with the ‘end/bios’ language that informed and climaxed 
his two stories (tel- words appearing six times, ‘life’ words appearing five times). He 
finishes the summary with his famous dictum ‘look to the end in all things (σκοπέειν δὲ 
χρὴ παντὸς χρήματος τὴν τελευτήν)’ (1.32.9), and connects this, by means of 
another explanatory γὰρ, with his final, vivid description of divine involvement in 
human affairs: ‘for the god, after showing blessedness to many, uproots and overturns 
them (πολλοῖσι γὰρ δὴ ὑποδέξας ὄλβον ὁ θεὸς προρρίζους ἀνέτρεψε)’. 
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 This boundary is exactly what epic menis safeguards: see Muellner 2005. 
70
 See also Pelling 2006, 146. 
42 
 
There is more to the Solonian story of death. For in the Cleobis and Biton story, 
death is through itself blessedness-generating: ‘the god showed in them that it is better 
for humans to be dead than to live (διέδεξέ τε ἐν τούτοισι ὁ θεὸς ὡς ἄμεινον εἴη 
ἀνθρώπῳ τεθνάναι μᾶλλον ἢ ζώειν)’ (1.31.3). The god did this by killing the young 
Argives: the end that proves divine phthonos, by proving that ‘many things happen that 
one does not want’, is actively given by the gods to the brothers as a blessing. For Solon, 
denying finitude is denying death; and death is better than living. Croesus is not simply 
wrong about blessedness; his error also ignores the very principle of blessedness, that is, 
the limit on human existence, the end of life. By Solon’s refutation of Croesus’ 
chrematistic-phthonotic claim, any denial of human finitude contradicts precisely that in 
which humans are blessed, the mortality that separates humanity and divinity, and which 
divine phthonos safeguards against violation. 
Thus, as every Greek since Homer knows, death is what guarantees the division 
of the kosmos into ‘human’ (mortal) and ‘divine’ (immortal). If the work of nomoi is to 
determine the limits placed on humans in interstate and intrastate systems, then human 
enforcement of nomoi is doing in subsets of the kosmos what divine phthonos is doing in 
the entire set.71 Conversely, violations of nomoi are violations of those limits, and hence 
mathematical denials of mortality: for the finitude of the set of human subsets is 
determined by the finitude of the entire human set, which is mortality. Thus within the 
Herodotean narrative the Croesus logos provides a foundational refutation of all nomos-
violators, or system-expanders and hence limit-expanders, enforced by divine phthonos. 
The human enforcement of nomoi by this kind of radicalized application of ‘inverse 
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 This is roughly the overall thesis of Ranulf  1933-34. 
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proportionality’ had already produced Gyges’ choice, ‘to kill Candaules or himself to 
die’. Here Solon recontextualizes this radical phthonos by expanding the system ‘Lydia’ 
to the system ‘the kosmos’, or ‘everything, considered as divided’. Candaules’ fall takes 
the form of queen’s tisis, Croesus’, divine nemesis (1.34.1). Solon’s refutation of nomos-
violation/system-expansion/limit-expansion is mortality. Croesus fully recognizes 
Solon’s wisdom only when he is about to die (1.86).72 
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 Thompson 1994, 14-16 draws a similar conclusion. Of course Croesus, unlike Candaules, does not die 
immediately: just after he recalls Solon’s wisdom, and Cyrus’ men fail to put out the threatening flames, an 
apparent miracle from Apollo saves Croesus’ life (1.87).  
  
 
4. Cambyses’ career: infinitizing nomos, divine universality, and phthonos eroticized 
 
 The picture we have so far assembled from the Herodotean narrative is something 
like the following. Paris introduced the ‘relevant similarity’ and implied the ‘finite 
system’ that phthonos presupposes. Candaules established the ‘inverse proportionality’ 
that arises when a nomos is violated, to which ‘inverse proportionality’ phthonos 
responds. Solon’s reply to Croesus positioned individuals within a finite political system, 
and argued that there is a set of all other sets, the kosmos, whose nomotic ‘sectional cuts’ 
are guarded by divine phthonos. Boundary-violations in all cases essentially involved 
physicality, sometimes erotically, and usually emphasized physical sight. Human-human 
and human-divine divisions were enforced by either tisis alone, or tisis in response to 
nomos-violation, or divine nemesis. Nomos-violators attempted to expand nomos-
determined sets, but were blocked by phthonotic responses, either human or divine. The 
finitude of each subset of the kosmos was ultimately determined by death, which the gods 
at times give phthonotically. 
 All of these logoi treat political systems in some way: Paris’ appeal to interstate 
precedent concerning the non-payment of dikas for princess-theft; Candaules’ use of the 
royal power of command to expand the nomos-determined to three; Croesus’ affirmation 
of supreme blessedness on the evidence of his unsurpassed wealth. Solon’s refutation of 
Croesus’ affirmation hinted at ‘infinitizing’ human desire, in his formulation of ‘what 
divine phthonos opposes’ as ‘humans doing everything they want’. Such ‘infinitizing’, if 
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necessarily entailed by a particular political system, would make that system essentially 
violate all nomoi as limits. Such a political system would necessarily entail the relevant 
sort of ‘inverse proportionality’, and hence necessarily generate phthonos, human and/or 
divine. But these three logoi presented no political system as essentially violating set-
divisions such that some perturbation-repairing phthonos responds. Candaules had the 
power to command Gyges, but the transgressiveness of the command came from his own 
phthonoticized eros, not his kingship; Croesus had tremendous wealth in virtue of his 
kingship, but his error lay not his wealth as such, but rather his phthonotic claim to 
supreme blessedness on account of his wealth. 
 The Cambyses logos offers an account of a political system that does violate set-
divisions in this way. In particular, the ‘infinitizing’ property ‘the king doing whatever he 
wants (βασιλεύοντι Περσέων ἐξεῖναι ποιέειν τὸ ἂν βούληται)’ appears for the 
first time explicitly in this logos (3.31.4). A verbal foreshadowing of this formulation had 
already appeared at 1.32.2, where Solon had been speaking counterfactually of humans in 
general. The formulation at 3.31.4 is not counterfactual, but is offered by the Persian 
βασιλήιοι δικασταί as an actual Persian nomos. The law permits the king to do 
whatever he wants; the actual limit on the king’s action is, then, determined entirely by 
the king’s desire. The indefinite particle ἂν makes this explicit: what the king can do is 
indeterminate in respect of the king’s will (cp. βούληται); the king’s wishing alone 
makes something happen or not happen. 
 The narrative context in which this law appears is important; for the formula 
appears in the mouths of the ‘Royal Judges’, who are speaking in fear of Cambyses’ 
power (3.31.5). Cambyses has just asked them ‘whether there is some law that someone 
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who wishes should marry his sister (εἴ τις ἐστὶ κελεύων νόμος τὸν βουλόμενον 
ἀδελφεῇ συνοικέειν)’ (3.31.2). The king does so wish; he so wishes because he ‘has 
eros for one of his sisters (ἠράσθη μιῆς τῶν ἀδελφεῶν Καμβύσης)’. Incest violates 
a universal, agraphos nomos73; this nomos, being universal, is safeguarded by the gods.74 
Cambyses violated it by eros toward his sister, which I will discuss later. But the 
narrative context of the incest-narrative is the invasion of Egypt, and Cambyses had 
invaded Egypt for a specific, related reason: he wished to marry Amasis’ daughter, but 
Amasis prevented him by a trick (3.1). This motivation for invading Egypt bridges 
interstate and intrastate sociopolitical systems in Herodotus’ treatment of Cambyses’ 
boundary-violations. Herodotus notoriously presents multiple motivations for his 
characters75, and Cambyses’ invasion of Egypt is no exception. But the first motivation 
Herodotus gives is Cambyses’ desire for Amasis’ daughter, or rather his anger in 
response to Amasis’ attempt to replace his own daughter with his predecessor Apries’. 
Cambyses’ request, itself motivated by a vengeful Egyptian physician, had placed 
Amasis in a quandary: if he should refuse Cambyses, then he would risk invasion from a 
terrible foreign power; if he should acquiesce, then his daughter would not be Cambyses’ 
wife (γυναῖκά), but his concubine (παλλακήν) (3.1.2). The first choice would harm 
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 Rudhart 1982. 
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 Cf. Xenophon, Memorabilia, 4.34-39. See also Munson 2001a, 251. The gods themselves, of course, 
most notably Zeus and Hera, do commit incest. Brown 1982, 397-99 briefly discusses Cambyses’ incest in 
relation to another religious violation, the murder of Apis; also see below. For Cambyses as a general 
violator of nomos, see e.g. Munson 1991. Herodotus presents Cambyses as nomos-violator at such length 
and so strongly that the famous ‘nomos is king’ discussion (3.38) is located within the Cambyses logos in 
order to prove that Cambyses, in violating all sorts of nomoi, really must have been insane. 
75
 Baragwanath 2008, 55-81 offers a detailed general overview of the complexity of Herodotus’ attribution 
of motives to his characters. 
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Egypt, and Amasis’ power; the second would harm Amasis’ daughter. Amasis’ solution 
is to replace his daughter with another woman, the daughter of his former rival, Apries 
(3.1.3). Cambyses discovers this through the woman’s unsolicited confession76, and 
consequently grows greatly angered at Egypt (μεγάλως θυμωθέντα ἐπ᾽ Αἴγυπτον) 
(3.1.5). This is, according to the opening of book 3, ‘the cause (αἰτίην τοιήνδε)’ of 
Cambyses’ invasion of Egypt.77 
This narrative requires some analysis. First, note that both of Amasis’ possible 
responses to Cambyses’ request involve the impossibility of simultaneous co-possession: 
either Egypt or his daughter must be given over to Persia, through war in the first case, or 
concubinage in the second. Amasis’ concern with the legitimacy of his daughter’s 
marriage may have been more than paternal altruism: concubinage would forfeit any 
political benefits of a marriage-alliance. Both choices, then, would harm Amasis 
precisely insofar as both would relate him and Cambyses such that Cambyses’ possession 
would necessarily entail Amasis’ lack. The first choice would establish this ‘inverse 
proportionality’ in respect of interstate relations; the second in respect of interpersonal 
relations. The problem, as Amasis sees it, is that he has only one daughter, and Cambyses 
wants her. If he does not get her, then in his resulting anger he will want Egypt, and, 
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 This is of course yet another instance of a woman acting totally on her own initiative, with vast 
sociopolitical implications. Here the willful confession is particularly interesting insofar as Apries’ 
daughter is given no motivation whatever. One is left to imagine her personal pride, loyalty to her father, 
indignation at being used as a political pawn, or some combination of the above. Herodotus’ complete 
silence allows the readers to imagine as rich a motivational structure as their imagination allows. 
77
 Baragwanath 2008, 110-12 considers the other reasons Herodotus gives for the expedition against Egypt. 
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being powerful, will get Egypt by invasion. If Cambyses cannot have Egypt in person, in 
the body of the pharaoh’s daughter, then he will have it in empire.78 
Amasis’ problem is solved by multiplying daughters – not in reality, as 
analogously Candaules had attempted to multiply ‘those who may see the queen naked’, 
but in perception, by deceiving Cambyses into thinking that he had Amasis’ daughter, 
when in fact he had only another beautiful woman. The attempt would have succeeded – 
if only Apries’ daughter had not confessed (3.1.4). The daughter shattered the deception 
by telling the truth, collapsing together the double world of Cambyses’ perception and 
Amasis’ manipulated reality, where according to the previous hypothetical amalgamation 
two of Amasis’ ‘daughters’ were happily serving both their father’s and husband’s 
respective wishes. Amasis tries to solve the problem of Amasis-Cambyses ‘inverse 
proportionality’ by multiplying the set of ‘Amasis’ daughters’ in whose singularity the 
‘inverse proportionality’ obtained. He fails, because his deception fails, and Cambyses’ 
angry response addresses Amasis’ daughter precisely insofar as she is not his. Insofar as 
                                                 
78
 Cf. Tomyris’ (accurate) interpretation of Cyrus’ wooing at 1.205: ‘ἡ δὲ Τόμυρις συνιεῖσα οὐκ αὐτήν 
μιν μνώμενον ἀλλὰ τὴν Μασαγετέων βασιληίην’. Cambyses himself elsewhere (1.34.4) ties 
personal and imperial accomplishment strongly together: when he asks what sort of man he is in 
comparison with his father Cyrus (κοῖός τις δοκέοι ἀνὴρ εἶναι πρὸς τὸν πατέρα τελέσαι Κῦρον), he 
does not approve of the Persians who argue that he is greater than his father because he conquered more 
territory (οἳ δὲ ἀµείβοντο ὡς εἴη ἀµείνων τοῦ piατρός· τά τε γὰρ ἐκείνου piάντα ἔχειν αὐτὸν καὶ 
piροσεκτῆσθαι Αἴγυpiτόν τε καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν), as much as he approves of Croesus, who asserts that 
Cambyses does not seem equal to his father because Cambyses has not yet produced such a son as himself 
(οὐ δοκέεις ὅμοιος εἶναι τῷ πατρί· οὐ γάρ κώ τοι ἐστὶ υἱὸς οἷον σε ἐκεῖνος κατελίπετο). In this 
passage Cambyses actually rates ‘having a son as great as Cambyses’ higher than ‘increasing the kingdom 
as much as Cambyses did’, suggesting that Cambyses’ concern for personal accomplishment is at least 
equal to, and perhaps greater than, his interest in imperial success. Avery 1972, 536 calls this ranking 
‘vanity’, and attributes it to Cambyses’ madness. 
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she is not his, she is Amasis’; and this phthonotic ‘inverse proportionality’ is Herodotus’ 
first presentation of possible reasons for Cambyses’ invasion of Amasis’ land.79 
This is how Cambyses’ Egyptian campaign begins. It ends with the divine tisis for 
Apis’ murder; but in between these respective peculiarities of marriage and religion an 
episode appears that combines both. The episode is the incest-narrative mentioned at the 
beginning of this section. This narrative contains the straightforward formulation of 
potentially infinite royal Persian authority, τὸ ἂν βούληται. Given that the turning-
points in the Cambyses logos that begin his Egyptian invasion, on the one hand, and end 
the invasion and his life, on the other, both involve phthonotic ‘inverse proportionality’, 
and together involve marriage, religion, and system-expansion of different sorts, the 
application of the ‘sectional cuts’ model to this formulation of Persian monarchical power 
seems particularly appropriate. The implications of this analysis are extreme: for where a 
finite set is divided by nomoi constituting a sociopolitical system, the potential infinitude 
of one section necessarily entails the potential nullity of the rest. If the ‘king’ section of 
the Persian state is infinite – which it actually is, if the king so wishes – then every other 
section is nothing. This means that any law of the ‘τὸ ἂν βούληται’ sort essentially 
contradicts every possible nomos, insofar as all nomoi section the finite system.80 This is 
the Persian monarchical nomos, at least as the terrified Royal Judges claim; therefore, at 
least insofar as Cambyses intimidates the Royal Judges, Persian monarchy is essentially 
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 Brown 1982, 391 conjectures that Herodotus’ source for this passage might have been a Persian tradition 
justifying the invasion of Egypt as legitimate revenge. If this is correct and, moreover, has some relevant 
bearing on the Herodotean narrative as such, this would be the first instance of a Persian king illegitimately 
presenting tisis as a casus belli, as Xerxes most famously is revealed (by Artemisia) to have done at 8.102. 
80
 Hardy 1996 draws a similar conclusion about unlimited monarchy from the story of Intaphrenes and his 
wife, in terms of the public/private distinction. 
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anomotic.81 The problem is not that conflicting nomoi impose incompatible requirements, 
producing the kind of tragic impasse that Xerxes, for example, may suffer82; but rather 
that a nomos that grants the king potentially unlimited power is in potential contradiction 
to every nomos that restricts the power of the king; and because the Persian state is finite, 
every nomos that grants anyone but the king any power at all is a nomos of this sort.83 
There is another implication of the potential infinitude of monarchical power. 
This implication follows immediately upon expanding the analyzed system from ‘Persia’ 
to ‘kosmos’: for potential infinitude of any section of any subset of the cosmic set entails 
more than merely the nullity of the other sections of the same subset. The ‘infinitizing’ 
monarchical nomos thus puts the king into potential ‘inverse proportionality’ with other 
Persians (in the intrastate set), non-Persians (in the interstate set), and even the gods (in 
the kosmos). The narrative emphasizes this by presenting the stark formulation of 
anomotic royal infinitude within the narrative of Cambyses’ incest. Incest violates a 
divinely-guarded nomos, so it is an appropriate context for the ‘infinitizing’ nomos to 
appear, as if incest were justified by the law permitting Cambyses to do ‘whatever he 
wants’. 
Now it turns out that the Royal Judges’ ‘infinitizing’ claim is simply false: the 
Persian king cannot do whatever he wants, indeed not in any of these systems. During his 
ethnographic digression in book 1 Herodotus had already mentioned (and praised) one 
Persian nomos that explicitly limits the king’s power: the king may not put anyone to 
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 Redfield 2002, 47-48 offers a similar interpretation of this passage. 
82
 Sancisi-Weerdenburg 2002, 586-88. 
83
 Munson 2001a, 169ff connects Cambyses’ lawlessness with contemporary sophistical debates, 
comparing Herodotus’ Cambyses to Plato’s Callicles (cf. Gorgias 483B). 
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death unless a quantitative accounting of that person’s good and bad deeds should show 
the former to exceed the latter (1.137.1).84 The failures of Cambyses’ wants have already 
been discussed, and a few of Darius’ and Xerxes’ most important failures will be 
discussed in the next section. But it is worth noting now that the only time that the wish 
of a Persian king is confronted with a Persian nomos that directly contradicts it, is in the 
Masistes logos in book 9, where Xerxes’ erotic desire for his brother’s wife is blocked by 
another vengeful queen’s careful application of another royal Persian nomos at a crucial 
point in the narrative.85 
The final point regarding the ‘infinitizing’ Persian royal nomos should already be 
obvious from the foregoing discussion. Insofar as this potential infinitude necessarily 
generates (radical) inverse proportionality between the king and all others, monarchical 
actions taken according to this potential infinitude generate phthonos at the three levels 
discussed – interstate, intrastate, and cosmic. Cambyses, insane, makes no attempt to 
avoid such phthonos’ triple response.86 But Darius and Xerxes do. Their attempts involve 
system-expansion of another sort, motivated differently and more intelligently than their 
predecessors in disrespect for boundaries, designed specifically to block the ‘inverse 
proportionality’ to which phthonos responds from obtaining in the first place. The 
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 The Greek makes Herodotus’ high opinion of this nomos quite explicit, and uses the term basileus: 
αἰνέω δὲ καὶ τόνδε, τὸ μὴ μιῆς αἰτίης εἵνεκα μήτε αὐτὸν τὸν βασιλέα μηδένα φονεύειν, μήτε 
τῶν ἄλλων Περσέων μηδένα τῶν ἑωυτοῦ οἰκετέων ἐπὶ μιῇ αἰτίῃ ἀνήκεστον πάθος ἔρδειν· 
ἀλλὰ λογισάμενος ἢν εὑρίσκῃ πλέω τε καὶ μέζω τὰ ἀδικήματα ἐόντα τῶν ὑπουργημάτων, 
οὕτω τῷ θυμῷ χρᾶται. 
85
 Cf. n46 above. Sancisi-Weedenburg 2002, 586-87n3 emphasizes that the immediate cause of Xerxes’ 
failure was not a foolish promise (pace Flory 1978, 152), but rather the Persian birthday-nomos, which 
moreover harms Xerxes only because of Amestris’ plot: ‘[h]e not only could not have refused, even 
avoidance of the occasion was beyond his power, as Herodotus recognizes.’ 
86
 For Cambyses’ insanity in relation to his violation of nomos see Munson 1991. 
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Cambyses narrative showed the essential contradiction between monarchical 
limitlessness and the finitude of any relevant set, deploying with novel intensity the 
nomos-tisis-phthonos complex presented in the earlier chapters. Cambyses’ Persian 
successors attempt to circumvent the limitation by avoiding the contradiction. Their 
failed attempts constitute and help explain the two Persian wars, the climax of ‘the evils 
between Greeks and barbarians’ that Herodotus wished to show (ἀπόδεξις) and explain 
(αἰτίην) from the beginning. 
  
 
5. Darius’ career: justifying expansionism, maintaining monarchy, and imperial 
‘looking to one’s own’ 
 
Darius first appears in a dream (1.209); immediately Cyrus sees him as being in a 
phthonotic relation to himself. Cyrus, asleep, had seen Darius spreading two wings over 
Europe and Asia. He takes this to mean that Darius is plotting against him, to take his 
kingdom (παῖς σὸς ἐπιβουλεύων ἐμοί τε καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ἀρχῇ ἑάλωκε). But the 
narrative voice authoritatively affirms that Cyrus here misinterpreted the dream. For in 
the following chapter (1.210) Herodotus declares that, whereas Cyrus supposed that 
Darius was plotting against him, in fact a divinity was showing him that he would die in 
that place (ὁ δαίμων προέφαινε ὡς αὐτὸς μὲν τελευτήσειν αὐτοῦ ταύτῃ 
μέλλοι), and that his kingdom would pass to Darius. The content of the dream does not 
justify Cyrus’ interpretation; he added something to the dream to come to his conclusion, 
and this addition, insofar as it led him to a false interpretation, was unjustified. 
All Cyrus saw in the dream was ‘Darius as king’. He thought this meant that 
Darius would overthrow him; so he thinks that ‘Darius as king’ and ‘Cyrus as king’ are 
incompatible, that the two are related by an inverse proportionality. The division of the 
Persian kingdom that implicitly underlies Cyrus’ faulty hermeneutic is such that anyone 
being king, except Cyrus, necessarily redounds to Cyrus’ not being king. Cyrus’ 
interpretation is wrong, Herodotus says, but his error introduces a dimension to 
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phthonotic relations between humans hitherto unseen the Herodotean narrative.87 The 
dimension is time. For Cyrus is wrong only because ‘Darius as king’ and ‘Cyrus as king’ 
are incompatible only when they obtain at the same time. By putting ‘Darius as king’ and 
‘Cyrus as king’ into this inverse relation, Cyrus has located them within the same finite 
set, and furthermore claimed that one’s kingship necessarily entails the other’s non-
kingship. But this is false because the finite set is not ‘Persia synchronic’ but ‘Persia 
diachronic’: Darius will indeed be king, but only after Cyrus has already died. 88 
Cyrus’ error is especially intriguing because Croesus was wrong insofar as he also 
did not take time into account. Croesus’ phthonotic calculation excluded the limit of life; 
Cyrus’ paranoid phthonotic hermeneutic ignored the limit of his own life.89 Cyrus missed 
the dream’s true meaning, that here his life was to come to an end (τελευτήσειν). The 
word echoes the repeated tel- words by which Solon refutes Croesus’ claim; the death 
signified by τελευτήσειν comes about as a result of Cyrus’ overextension of the empire 
into the mysteriously unbounded, otherworldly Massegetae land.90 Death intervenes to 
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 Divine tisis for Gyges’ regicide came five generations after the crime, so time did enter into human-
divine relations: in fact, the gods’ cognizance of time, and humans’ ignorance of it, is central to Apollo’s 
defense against Croesus’ accusation that the gods had treated him ungratefully (1.91). 
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 Brown 1982, 388-89 reads the dream exactly conversely, arguing that it portrays Darius in the dream-role 
of the usurper, hinting at an unfavorable tradition concerning Darius’ kingship. Brown’s and my positions 
are perhaps complementary rather than contradictory, as Brown’s supports the comparative instability of 
Darius’ kingship that I am about to discuss. 
89
 Cyrus’ phthonotic distortion of the prophetic dream parallels Croesus’ earlier filtering of the Delphic 
oracle through his own over-optimistic, imperialistic lens: the ‘great empire’ that the oracle had predicted 
Croesus would destroy by invading Persia (ἢν στρατεύηται ἐπὶ Πέρσας, μεγάλην ἀρχὴν μιν 
καταλύσειν) (1.53.1) was not Cyrus’, as Croesus thought (ὑπερήσθη τε τοῖσι χρηστηρίοισι, πάγχυ 
τε ἐλπίσας καταλύσειν τὴν Κύρου βασιληίην) (1.54.1), but his own (κατὰ τὸ χρηστήριόν τε 
καταπαύσαντα τὴν ἑωυτοῦ μεγάλην ἀρχήν) (1.86.1). Croesus’ fatal invasion, like Cyrus’, involved 
crossing the river Halys, which constitutes an interstate boundary (Immerwahr 1966, 84). 
90
 Cf. Walcot 1978, 32. 
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falsify Cyrus’ phthonotic interpretation as death intervened to falsify Croesus’ phthonotic 
claim. Solon set a quantitative limit on human life; Cyrus, partly through Croesus’ 
advice, did not set a quantitative limit on empire.91 He failed to recognize the god’s 
warning, that he would die as a result of engaging in expansionist war – refusing to 
respect boundaries92 – because he failed to consider the limit of his own life. In fact the 
dream of ‘Darius as king’ signified Cyrus’ temporal finitude; in Cyrus’ reading precisely 
the absence of ‘temporal finitude’ from the dream-hermeneutic led him to misinterpret 
the dream.93 
Thus Darius comes into the narrative as a phthonotic challenge to unlimited royal 
power. As the Histories presents it, Darius rises to power by overthrowing Magian rule, 
as Cyrus had overthrown Median rule and so constituted the Persians as a separate and 
monarchical people. The overthrow of the Medes and the accession of Cyrus as the first 
Persian monarch are narrated together: the narrative of one is the narrative of the other, 
because the Persians overthrew the Medes only when Cyrus made himself their single 
leader. But Darius’ accession was not identical to the Magians’ overthrow, since an 
aristocratic conspiracy, not a monarchically-constituted popular uprising, mobilized 
Persian rebellion against Magian rule. Nor are Darius’ ‘overthrow’ and ‘accession’ 
narratives even immediately juxtaposed (let alone materially identical), again for the 
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 Pelling 2006, 164-172 discusses Croesus’ expansionist advice to Cyrus in light of Solon’s earlier advice 
to Croesus. 
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 Immerwahr 1966, 75 and 92 cite the river Araxes, which Cyrus must cross in order to invade the land of 
the Massegetae as a real boundary between states. 
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 Moreover, the formal character of Cyrus’ error contradicts narrativity as such: for narrative as such, in 
contradistinction to syllogistic, presents its terms as essentially temporally sequenced. Cyrus does not know 
that he will die before his dream becomes reality. The narrator does; he can foreshadow, and can read the 
dream as a foreshadowing, as Cyrus cannot, inasmuch as the narrator does, and Cyrus does not. see the 
temporal limit of Cyrus’ life/kingship. 
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same reason: nothing about the aristocratic conspiracy required that Darius be made the 
Persian king. But Herodotus emphasizes the separation between overthrow and the 
accession by interrupting the narrative by still one more, vital, passage: the constitutional 
debate at 3.80-82.94 I will not discuss the much-discussed debate here, but rather merely 
note that its presence confirms that, as Herodotus tells the story, not only is Darius kept 
distinct from kingship, but kingship itself is kept distinct from Persia.95 
 Inasmuch, then, as Darius’ kingship is not so firmly established as Cyrus’ – for 
questioning Cyrus’ kingship is questioning Persian statehood, insofar as the two cannot 
be separated within the narrative – the new, post-aristocratic king must find some way to 
fend off any possible aristocratic challenge. No aristocrats challenged Cyrus, because in 
Cyrus’ time there was no Persian aristocracy: before Cyrus the Persians had been a 
subject people, unaccustomed to ruling, accustomed instead to following orders from a 
master. What Cyrus did – and the Herodotean narrative presents the issue in just this 
way96 – was simply to replace their oppressive foreign masters with a benevolent native 
king. The difference between Cyrus and the other Persians, as Herodotus presents it, was 
unbridgeable: Cyrus was their liberator, they were his men. This difference constituted 
the lack of ‘relevant similarity’ required to establish ‘inverse proportionality’ to which 
the phthonos that Otanes observes accompanies all tyrants responds. No-one envied 
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 See e.g. Pelling 2002, Thompson 1996, 52-78. 
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 The debate’s outcome is unsurprising; what is surprising is that a debate on forms of government took 
place in Persia at all (as Herodotus goes out of his way to note: ἐλέχθησαν λόγοι ἄπιστοι μὲν ἐνίοισι 
Ἑλλήνων, ἐλέχθησαν δ᾽ ὦν (3.80.1)). Herodotus’ audience is unlikely to believe that the Persians even 
worried about such things, but Herodotus emphatically asserts that they did. Thus Herodotus’ almost 
apologetic presentation of the constitutional debate, by opposing its factuality to Greek expectations, 
highlights possibility that Persian government might not even have been monarchical. 
96
 Avery 1972, 531-34. 
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Cyrus, because no-one was sufficiently like Cyrus that his benefit redounded to their 
harm. In fact, exactly the contrary was true: Cyrus’ benefit, as king, is precisely what 
most benefitted the Persians, insofar as his monarchical leadership generated their 
freedom.97 
Note that the mutuality of this benefit took the Persians’ ‘slave-master’ relation to 
the Medes as a necessary precondition: Cyrus’ and his subjects’ goods would not have 
coincided if the Medes had not previously enslaved the Persians; because then ‘Persia 
being freed’, which Cyrus made identical to ‘Cyrus being king’, would have been 
nonsense. As Herodotus presents it, Cyrus’ avoidance of intrastate Persian phthonos 
depended on the Persian political system’s interstate relation to the Median political 
system – a departure from the previous political system, as far as the Persian state is 
concerned. 
 Darius acceded in no such felicitously aphthonotic way. In this second rebellion-
accession sequence, ‘Persia being freed’ and ‘Darius being king’ had nothing essential to 
do with each other. It would have been perfectly possible for Persia to be freed from 
Magian domination, and Darius simultaneously not to be king – as the narratives of the 
aristocratic conspiracy, constitutional debate, and almost exaggeratedly contingent 
selection of Darius as monarch clearly show. Here again ‘Persia being freed’ depended 
on Persia’s relation to an extra-Persian political system (the Magians’), but Darius’ 
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 Herodotus nicely summarizes the first three Persian monarchs’ differing relations to their subjects in the 
mouths of the Persians themselves: ‘λέγουσι Πέρσαι ὡς Δαρεῖος μὲν ἦν κάπηλος, Καμβύσης δὲ 
δεσπότης, Κῦρος δὲ πατήρ, ὃ μὲν ὅτι ἐκαπήλευε πάντα τὰ πρήγματα, ὁ δὲ ὅτι χαλεπός τε ἦν 
καὶ ὀλίγωρος, ὁ δὲ ὅτι ἤπιός τε καὶ ἀγαθά σφι πάντα ἐμηχανήσατο.’ (1.89.3). The father-child 
relation used to describe the Cyrus-Persians relation emphasizes the intimacy of Cyrus’ bond with the 
Persians, which is constituted by his benevolence and generousness in providing them with ‘all good 
things’. 
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kingship as such was not, as Cyrus’ was, the specific difference between ‘Persia 
enslaved’ and ‘Persia free’. 
From his accession, then, and owing to its specific mode, Darius is not, as Cyrus 
is, insusceptible to intrastate phthonos. He is surely aware of this, also from the start: for 
the ‘relevant similarity’ obtaining among aristocrats, and its relation to, as sufficient 
material precondition for, phthonos-generating inverse proportionality98, is exactly the 
argument he had presented against oligarchy during the constitutional debate (3.82). The 
argument (3.82.3) is worth quoting in full:  
ἐν δὲ ὀλιγαρχίῃ πολλοῖσι ἀρετὴν ἐπασκέουσι ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ἔχθεα ἴδια 
ἰσχυρὰ φιλέει ἐγγίνεσθαι· αὐτὸς γὰρ ἕκαστος βουλόμενος κορυφαῖος 
εἶναι γνώμῃσί τε νικᾶν ἐς ἔχθεα μεγάλα ἀλλήλοισι ἀπικνέονται, ἐξ ὧν 
στάσιες ἐγγίνονται, ἐκ δὲ τῶν στασίων φόνος. 
 
But in oligarchy, they offer excellence to many in public matters, but bitter 
private hatreds are wont to come to be: for each one wishes to be head, and to be 
victorious in counsels, and they fall into great hatreds toward one another, from 
which staseis arise, and from these staseis, murder. 
 
By wishing to be the ‘head’, and to be ‘victorious’ in counsels, each oligarch sets himself 
up in inverse proportionality to the others. Since oligarchy as such entails relevant 
political equality among the ruling few – for if one were superior, then the politeia would 
no longer be oligarchic, but monarchical – therefore the desire to be ‘head’ and 
‘victorious’ cannot be resolved within the political system. Anomotic desires of this sort 
are solved, Darius notes, by murder (φόνος). The result is monarchy in any case (ἐκ δὲ 
τοῦ φόνου ἀπέβη ἐς μουναρχίην); and, moreover, not merely ‘the rule of one’, but 
rather ‘the rule of the single best’ – because the ‘one’ remaining after oligarchic 
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competition is by agonistic necessity the victor in the political agon, and hence by 
Darian-Darwinian definition the political best. 
So Darius understands oligarchic phthonos. He does indeed become monarch 
(3.84-88); but not by killing his rivals, those relevantly similar to him. By his own 
argument, then, the absence of oligarchic strife – the result of the constitutional debate, 
the agreement afterwards reached, and Otanes’ shrewd withdrawal from monarchial 
consideration – means that, within Darius’ Persian kingdom, relevantly similar Persians 
remain. These are potential kings; they are therefore, in virtue of their relevant similarity, 
related to Darius by the inverse proportionality to which phthonos responds. The fully 
contextualized Herodotean Darius understands this, for he says so, and even argues that 
this is the reason that Persian kingship should even exist, even before he becomes king. 
 Atossa also understands this; and she offers this to Darius as sufficient reason for 
him to conduct expansionist imperial warfare (3.134), seeking to avoid the ‘inverse 
proportionality’ to which phthonos responds. This can be taken as a response to what 
Otanes sees as the decisive refutation of monarchy, namely, that ‘phthonos is born in 
humans from the beginning (φθόνος δὲ ἀρχῆθεν ἐμφύεται ἀνθρώπῳ)’ (3.80.3). In 
the constitutional debate, Darius had never directly answered Otanes; he had used 
Otanes’ own weapon against Megabyzus, relocating phthonos in oligarchs rather than 
monarchs. But if Otanes is correct, that phthonos obtains simply as a matter of human 
nature (ἐμφύεται), then the monarch too must address phthonos in some way; and 
Darius must address phthonos more than others, because of how he acceded to the throne. 
He does not, until Atossa persuades him. Her argument to Darius inaugurates Persian 
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imperial policy99; she excites in Darius a desire for Scythia, but she, serving as 
Demokedes’ mouthpiece, wanted Darius to invade Greece. Her argument thus provides a 
single justification for both invasions, tying together Darius’ reasoning and motivation 
for both invasions. Within the overall narrative, the Scythian expedition serves as a kind 
of mirroring precursor to the invasion of Greece100; within Atossa’s argument at 3.134, 
the relation of Scythia to Greece is already rather complex, and needs to be examined 
within the larger narrative context. The basic reason she gives for imperialism per se is, I 
will argue, simply ‘to avoid phthonos by making relevant similarity not obtain’. But 
Atossa’s argument has more specific goals, and Herodotus’ account is worth examining 
quite closely. 
Interpreting the passage is complicated by the fact that the argument was not 
Atossa’s idea: rather Demokedes, Darius’ physician from Crotona, had pressed Atossa 
into making the argument, as a condition for his offering her medical treatment (3.133). 
Atossa wanted simply to be healed from a terrible, shameful (αἰσχυνομένη) illness; 
Demokedes put imperialist words into her mouth, presumably so as to secure his own 
return to Crotona – a motivation strongly suggested at 3.130, where Demokedes’ desire 
to return to Greece first appears, and at 3.135, where the fruit of Atossa’s advice includes 
Demokedes’ craftily-achieved nostos.101 Atossa trusts in his medical skill because he had 
healed Darius when all others had failed (3.129-30); Darius trusted him then because of 
                                                 
99
 Immerwahr 1956, 271n60. 
100
 Hartog 1988, 12-57. 
101
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his reputation (τις πρότερον ἔτι ἐν Σάρδισι τοῦ Κροτωνιήτεω Δημοκήδεος τὴν 
τέχνην ἀγγέλλει τῷ Δαρείῳ) (3.129.3), which presumably is connected with 
Crotona’s reputation as having the best physicians in Greece. Now Herodotus says that 
Crotona owes its reputation primarily to Demokedes’ accomplishments during his 
sojourn as Polykrates’ physician in Samos (οὕτω μὲν ἀπίκετο ἐς τὴν Σάμον, καὶ 
ἀπὸ τούτου τοῦ ἀνδρὸς οὐκ ἥκιστα Κροτωνιῆται ἰητροὶ εὐδοκίμησαν) 
(3.131.2). This connects Demokedes’ medical skill with Polykrates; and Polykrates’ 
downfall is one of the most famous of all Herodotean stories of divine phthonos. As 
Amasis says, Polykrates’ excess consists in his wealth and power (ἐμοὶ δὲ αἱ σαὶ 
μεγάλαι εὐτυχίαι οὐκ ἀρέσκουσι, τὸ θεῖον ἐπισταμένῳ ὡς ἔστι φθονερόν) 
(3.40.2); Demokedes’ stay on Samos would have offered Demokedes ample opportunity 
to understand the importance of wealth to power; and the relation of wealth and power to 
imperial display is exactly what the advice he gets Atossa to give Darius seeks to address. 
Atossa speaks to Darius in bed, but names him ‘king’ (ἡ Ἄτοσσα προσέφερε 
ἐν τῇ κοίτῃ Δαρείῳ λόγον τοιόνδε: ὦ βασιλεῦ) (3.134.1). The kind of narrative 
detail contributed by ἐν τῇ κοίτῃ adds typically Herodotean vividness, but also 
complicates the performative context of the argument, and hence the rhetorical impact of 
Atossa’s ‘king’. Atossa is about to suggest a course of action designed to maintain 
Darius’ royal power; by beginning her argument with ‘king’ in this intimate setting, she 
contextualizes Darius’ kingship against the background of their personal relationship, 
directing his sympathy as husband toward the argument concerning kingship that she is 
about to give. Her next word is a circumstantial participle (ἔχων), specifying her address 
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as ‘king’ to Darius’ kingly power (δύναμιν): she is speaking to and about Darius 
inasmuch as he is king, and inasmuch as he possesses kingly power. She emphasizes his 
power’s magnitude (τοσαύτην), but follows this laud with an admonishment, shading 
the circumstantial sense of the ἔχων toward concession: ‘although having such great 
power, you sit down, acquiring neither any people nor power for the Persians (κάτησαι, 
οὔτε τι ἔθνος προσκτώμενος οὔτε δύναμιν Πέρσῃσι)’ (3.134.1). Something is 
good about Darius – he is king, and has great power; something else, nevertheless, is bad 
about Darius, namely, that he does not increase the Persian kingdom. Darius’ royalty and 
power are thus opposed to his non-expansionism. 
This sets up Atossa’s next step: ‘it is fitting that a young man and lord of great 
wealth show himself demonstrating something (οἰκὸς δὲ ἐστὶ ἄνδρα καὶ νέον καὶ 
χρημάτων μεγάλων δεσπότην φαίνεσθαί τι ἀποδεικνύμενον)’ (3.134.2). The 
‘something’ Darius ought fittingly to show forth must be somehow fitting to his youth 
and property, which are things proper to him, in contradistinction to others. In the 
argument’s performative context the phrase ‘ἄνδρα καὶ νέον καὶ χρημάτων 
μεγάλων δεσπότην’ emphasizes Darius’ personal attributes, but they are that to which 
the ‘thing to be shown’ is fitting, while the ‘thing to be shown’ is the thing to be fitted to 
his personal attributes. He is in fact different – young and lord of great wealth; he must 
now show this to the Persians, so that they know how different his youth and wealth 
make him. Demonstrating the difference between Darius and the other Persians is 
precisely the goal toward which she orders this ‘fitting’ advice, as she says in the purpose 
clause attached: ‘so that the Persians may learn that they are ruled by a man (ἵνα καὶ 
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Πέρσαι ἐκμάθωσι ὅτι ὑπ᾽ ἀνδρὸς ἄρχονται)’. Those respects in which Darius is 
already distinguished are wealth and youth – attributes proper to him in his present 
physical and political state. Merely ‘showing’ (ἀποδεικνύμενον) something ‘fitting’ to 
these pre-existing attributes is sufficient to show himself to the Persians as their ruler. 
The relevant difference between ‘Darius the ruler’ and ‘Persians the ruled’ is indicated by 
what Atossa is about to advise him to do.  
So far the general purpose of Atossa’s argument can already be discerned: to 
show the Persians that the one that rules them is different from the rest of the Persians. It 
is not enough merely to be different – this is the given fact, Darius’ youth and wealth. It 
is necessary also to show himself as different, in order to put himself in the appropriate 
‘ruler-ruled’ relation to the Persians. But if the ruler is to the ruled as ‘shown to be 
youthful/wealthy’ is to ‘seeing the one shown to be youthful/wealthy’, then the ‘ruler-
ruled’ relation Atossa is proposing Darius should make evident by expansion is a relation 
in which rule and ruled are dissimilar precisely in respect of rule. Darius’ purpose in 
conducting imperialist wars, according to Atossa’s argument, is that the Persians should 
learn ‘that they are ruled by a man’. The similarity relevant to rule is exactly what 
Atossa is telling Darius he should make not obtain by imperial expansion. The similarity 
relevant to rule is the material precondition of the inverse proportionality to which 
phthonos responds. Thus Atossa is counseling Darius to cut off intrastate phthonos before 
it starts, by blocking its necessary preconditions through system-expansion over interstate 
boundaries.102 
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Moreover, imperial system-expansion changes the size of the finite set that the 
nomoi divide into sections, establishing each member in his or her proper sociopolitical 
position. Because one section’s expansion necessarily entails the others’ contraction only 
insofar as the multiple sections together subdivide a finite set, the expansion of the set’s 
boundaries allows one section’s expansion not necessarily to entail the others’ 
contraction. In this way imperial expansion blocks phthonos by relocating the second 
term of monarchical ‘inverse proportionality’ to others outside the state. Darius must 
increase his power in order not to be relevantly similar to his subjects; but if this increase 
should remain within the boundaries of the Persian state, then it would redound to his 
subjects’ harm, and hence generate phthonos anyway.103 The ‘waxing king’ must ‘show’ 
something that does not redound to his subjects’ harm; since this cannot be from within 
his present dominion, he must expand the borders of his dominion to increase 
quantitatively the set in which his sociopolitical relation is realized. 
The desirability of becoming a ‘waxing king’ is conveyed in general terms by the 
purpose clause in conjunction with Atossa’s first mention of the ‘something’ that Darius 
ought to ‘show’. But Atossa understands the full range of anti-phthonotic requirements, 
                                                                                                                                                 
womanliness, which is as far from rebellion as possible (1.154-56). The attempt involved changing their 
national customs from the courageous bellicosity Cyrus encountered during his military campaign (ἄπειπε 
μέν σφι πέμψας ὅπλα ἀρήια μὴ ἐκτῆσθαι) to the soft pursuits of peace (κέλευε δὲ σφέας κιθῶνάς 
τε ὑποδύνειν τοῖσι εἵμασι καὶ κοθόρνους ὑποδέεσθαι, πρόειπε δ᾽ αὐτοῖσι κιθαρίζειν τε καὶ 
ψάλλειν καὶ καπηλεύειν παιδεύειν τοὺς παῖδας. καὶ ταχέως σφέας ὦ βασιλεῦ γυναῖκας ἀντ᾽ 
ἀνδρῶν ὄψεαι γεγονότας, ὥστε οὐδὲν δεινοί τοι ἔσονται μὴ ἀποστέωσι). If Lydian men live 
customarily like women, Croesus argues, then Cyrus’ rule as such cannot redound to their harm. Of course 
this ‘reducing the potentially phthonotic’ solution is not available to Darius in his particular circumstances, 
since he cannot maintain his strength as king by weakening the Persians that compose his army and 
bureaucracy. 
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and has more specific advice for the king. She briefly mentions that war prevents plotting 
(ἵνα τρίβωνται πολέμῳ μηδὲ σχολὴν ἄγοντες ἐπιβουλεύωσί τοι), but Darius 
needs no encouragement on this front: apparently he had already been considering an 
invasion of Scythia (1.34.4). At the beginning of book 4 Herodotus will attribute Darius’ 
Scythia-directed bellicosity straightforwardly to tisis, a motivation the Scythians 
themselves recognize; this covers ‘war’ simpliciter, but does not address the other reason 
Atossa gave for invasion, because tisis against Scythia does not expand the Persian 
political system. Merely invading other lands, without this invasion being also 
expansionist, is not enough to avoid ‘relevant similarity’ between Darius and his subjects. 
Atossa clarifies immediately: ‘see now, hold off first to go against the Scythians, for 
whenever you wish, they are yours; but wage war for me against Hellas; for I am eager, 
having heard by report, that I should have Argive and Attic and Corinthian serving-
women (οὗτοι γάρ, ἐπεὰν σὺ βούλῃ, ἔσονταί τοι· σὺ δέ μοι ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα 
στρατεύεσθαι. ἐπιθυμέω γὰρ λόγῳ πυνθανομένη Λακαίνας τέ μοι γενέσθαι 
θεραπαίνας καὶ Ἀργείας καὶ Ἀττικὰς καὶ Κορινθίας)’ (3.134). Simply going to 
war is not enough for Atossa; she wishes also that Darius acquire the spoils of war. This 
picks up and adds to the great wealth (χρημάτων μεγάλων) Darius already possesses 
by showing something ‘fitting’ in respect of which Darius ought to show himself to the 
Persians as their king. By adding ‘Greek serving-women’ to Darius’ proposal of ‘war 
simpliciter’ she distinguishes simple tisis from the system-expansion that her anti-
phthonotic strategy requires. 
This distinction, which is crucial to understanding the Herodotean difference 
between phthonotic and aphthonotic warfare, will be highlighted during Xerxes’ 
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invasion, when he chooses to continue the campaign even after his tisis-purpose has been 
fulfilled. But the goal sought by Atossa’s system-expansion – the blocking of relevant 
similarity prerequired for phthonos’ inverse proportionality – has another comparandum 
in the Histories. This is Deioces, at 1.96-100. Where Atossa uses imperial expansion, 
Deioces uses judicial wisdom; but in the Deioces narrative, Herodotus is even more 
explicit about Deioces’ desire to appear different from his subjects, and Herodotus’ 
description of Deioces’ purpose should help clarify Atossa’s advice (1.99.2): 
ταῦτα δὲ περὶ ἑωυτὸν ἐσέμνυνε τῶνδε εἵνεκεν, ὅκως ἂν μὴ ὁρῶντες οἱ 
ὁμήλικες, ἐόντες σύντροφοί τε ἐκείνῳ καὶ οἰκίης οὐ φλαυροτέρης οὐδὲ 
ἐς ἀνδραγαθίην λειπόμενοι, λυπεοίατο καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοιεν, ἀλλ᾽ 
ἑτεροῖός σφι δοκέοι εἶναι μὴ ὁρῶσι. 
 
 [Deioces] magnified these things concerning himself for this reason, that those of 
his age, having been brought up with him and being neither of lesser estate nor 
deficient in manliness, should not be grieved to see him, and plot against him, but 
so that he should seem to be of a different sort to those not seeing him.  
 
Deioces maintains the appearance of difference with no reference to real difference, 
leaving the vastness of difference to his subjects’ imagination.104 Insofar as Darius is 
already really different, he need merely show this pre-existing real difference to his 
subjects; insofar as he is not different from his subjects, he must increase this difference 
by magnifying and adding to the things in which he is different from them. Deioces’ 
approach does not involve system-expansion, because the perception of difference is 
generated by a lie. Atossa’s Darius wishes to be different in reality, and hence needs to 
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expand the state so that his royal section can expand into some division other than his 
subjects’.105 
There is more to Atossa’s ‘reification’ of anti-phthonotic difference-generation 
than simply the Persian stricture against lying (1.136) – anyway Darius is happy to lie 
when expediency so demands (3.72).106 Atossa also wants the things that expansion will 
allow Darius to acquire (the serving-women); but she wants these because she has heard 
of them by hearsay (πυνθανομένη).107 The first piercing of the Persian boundary from 
Hellas, during Darius’ rule and directly connected with the Persian Wars, is not Darius’ 
invasion itself, nor even the Ionian revolt, but the report of the Greek serving-women that 
Atossa presents as her reason for wanting Darius to expand into Greece. She wants 
something that is not within her land; she presents herself as conceiving her imperialist 
desire for Hellas because she has, through hearsay, looked to something not her own.108 
This collocation of phthonos-avoiding system-expansion with the violation of the ‘look to 
one’s own’ Lydian nomos materially joins two motives for set-expansion in their 
essential relation to phthonos. If violation of ‘look to one’s own’ suggests eros, as in the 
Candaules logos where the nomos first appeared, then Atossa’s imperialism is 
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suggestively erotic.109 Since it is essentially anti-phthonotic, Herodotus is here playing 
with two different sorts of monarchical mistakes, subtly hinting that even the Persian 
king’s attempt to maintain himself in power, which makes him imperialistic, is associated 
with the kind of violation of the sociopolitical ‘sectional cut’ that brought down the 
earlier Lydian monarch. 
This point is crucial for understanding the close Herodotean link between 
tyrannos and mounarchos, in contradistinction to earlier and etymologically-founded 
Greek usage. Etymologically, tyrants are rulers that have gained power by 
unconstitutional means; monarchs are simply single rulers, whether constitutional or not. 
But Persian monarchs are constituted by the ‘infinitizing’ monarchical claim, which we 
have already seen essentially supersedes every nomos insofar as nomoi make sectional 
cuts presupposing finitude of the relevantly divided system. Persian kings are in this 
respect no different from tyrants because the ‘infinitized’ Persian monarchy is essentially 
anti-nomotic, and hence, insofar politeiai imply nomoi, unconstitutional.110 
This may be uniquely true of the Persian monarch, insofar as Herodotus makes 
explicitly formulated monarchical constitutions available. But phthonos as it functions in 
Atossa’s model of monarchy provides a useful interpretive tool. For insofar as the Persian 
monarch is not nomotically limited, he rules in potential inverse proportionality to his 
subjects; precisely in the unlimited magnitude of his power, he is therefore perpetually 
susceptible to phthonotic response. The two Lydian kings suffered perturbation-
correcting phthonos only when they attempted to do something over and above their 
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monarchical constitution; Atossa’s Darius must anticipate anti-monarchical phthonos 
even when he does nothing but ‘be the Persian king’. This is so because of the 
‘infinitizing’ character of Persian monarchy; it is manifest in the Persian king’s 
susceptibility to phthonotic response, precisely insofar as ‘infinitizing’ monarchy 
necessarily contradicts set-dividing nomoi. Persian ‘infinitized’ monarchy is the extreme 
case, but any nomos-violating king is a tyrant insofar as violating a nomos is formally 
violating the ‘sectional cuts’ that divide any nomotic system. Phthonos responds to these 
violations, because they establish inverse proportionality between the king and others: 
wherever the king’s actions produce phthonos, the king is acting tyrannically. Thus 
phthonos, when it appears in all the complexity of the Herodotean narrative, can be used 
as an index of the nomos-violating and hence tyrannical character of any Herodotean 
monarch’s rule. 
  
 
6. Xerxes’ career: a gesture toward fuller treatment 
 
 A comprehensive treatment of Persian monarchs in the Histories in their relation 
to this nexus of tisis, nomos, and phthonos lies beyond the scope of what this discussion 
can address. The Herodotean treatment of tisis, nomos, and phthonos has become richer 
and more complicated as we have progressed, as the passages under discussion move 
further and deeper into the text, and consequently our treatment has become increasingly 
selective. The Histories progresses cumulatively and intelligibly, painting an ever more 
variegated picture of Herodotus’ two subjects: what the ethnography treats, the 
interaction of individuals and groups within a society; and what the war-narrative treats, 
the interaction of different sociopolitical systems within the grand interstate theater of 
Europe-Asia relations.111 This thesis has barely touched on Herodotean ethnography; but 
if interstate systems are related to intrastate systems as my argument requires, then no 
discussion of phthonos in the Histories could be complete, even within its own purview, 
without a detailed examination of each nation’s practices, as Herodotus presents them. 
 But the ethnographic digressions grow thinner as the inquiry progresses, and by 
the time Xerxes’ war begins at book 7, all the major players in the interstate zero-sum 
game have already been named, described, and located within an intelligible and 
coherent, if astonishingly complex, narrative. The various strands of the Herodotean 
programme, first laid down at the opening of book 1 and cultivated through six books and 
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three Persian kings, come to fruition in the story of the last war treated by the Histories, 
during the career of Herodotus’ last Persian king. The last chapter of this thesis will serve 
as a brief postscript to the main argument, gesturing toward a later, fuller treatment of 
books 7-9 where, in the figure of Xerxes and the closing of the Persian Wars, the themes 
introduced in book 1 develop to their fullest degree of complexity and climax in a 
deliberately structured close.112 
Book 7 opens with a competition for the Persian throne: neither Artobazanes nor 
Xerxes has a stronger claim within the Persian state, because Persia has no nomos 
determining the royal succession. A Spartan nomos must be imported before Darius will 
deliver the inheritance to Xerxes; but Herodotus notes that none of this really mattered, 
because ‘Atossa had all the power (ἡ γὰρ Ἄτοσσα εἶχε τὸ πᾶν κράτος)’ (7.3.4). 
Xerxes comes to the throne without support of Persian nomoi; he inherits two unfinished 
wars and the same expansionist customs that Cyrus had founded, and that Darius had 
pursued against Greece. 
At first Xerxes has no interest in war against Greece – the more expansionist of 
the two wars, insofar as Egypt had earlier been under Persian control. But Mardonius, 
perversely twisting the ‘wise advisor’ role toward his own interests, persuades Xerxes to 
invade Greece, enlarging an appeal to tisis for the burning of Sardis by citing advantage 
to Persia and the king (7.5). After conquering Egypt, Xerxes calls a council of the best 
Persians (σύλλογον ἐπίκητον Περσέων τῶν ἀρίστων ἐποιέετο) (7.8) and repeats 
Mardonius’ justifications for war against Greece. But before presenting any of 
Mardonius’ arguments, Xerxes appeals first to Persian nomos, and to Darius’ will: for 
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 For a full discussion of the closure of the Histories see Dewald 1997. 
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Xerxes’ self-presentation it is extremely important to show that he is not himself 
initiating expansionist war (οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς κατηγήσομαι νόμον τόνδε ἐν ὑμῖν τιθείς, 
παραδεξάμενός τε αὐτῷ χρήσομαι) (7.8a). But Xerxes goes far beyond Darius’ 
limited aims, offering in his speech to the Persian nobles a picture of universal Persian 
dominion, its boundaries identical to the limits of what the sun touches (οὐ γὰρ δὴ 
χώρην γε οὐδεμίαν κατόψεται ἥλιος ὅμουρον ἐοῦσαν τῇ ἡμετέρῃ, ἀλλὰ 
σφέας πάσας ἐγὼ ἅμα ὑμῖν χώρην θήσω) (7.8c.2). The Persian sociopolitical 
system is to be identical with the system of the world:  Xerxes’ solution to the problem of 
phthonotic response to boundary-violation is to obliterate all interstate boundaries to the 
Persian king’s rule. 
This is the extreme case of system-expansion, synecdochally signified by the 
bridging of Europe and Asia, dissolving a boundary guarded by the phthonos of the gods 
(ἀλλὰ θεοί τε καὶ ἥρωες, οἳ ἐφθόνησαν ἄνδρα ἕνα τῆς τε Ἀσίης καὶ τῆς 
Εὐρώπης βασιλεῦσαι) (8.109.3)113 and affirmed by a customary Persian judgment first 
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 Artabanus famously argues that the phthonos of the gods will destroy this expedition, precisely because 
Xerxes’ army is so large: ‘ὁ θεὸς φθονήσας φόβον ἐμβάλῃ ἢ βροντήν’ (7.10e). His larger argument 
cites his previous success as Darius’ ‘wise advisor’, when he opposed the invasion of Scythia: part of 
Artabanus’ wisdom, then, consists in his familiarity with divine phthonos, as Solon had earlier argued 
against Croesus. At first Xerxes decides against the expedition; but Herodotus complicates the picture 
considerably by the story of Xerxes’ two dreams, followed by Artabanus’ one dream, threateningly 
commanding Xerxes to invade. Later (7.47), after beginning the invasion owing to the apparent divine 
command, Xerxes asks Artabanus whether he would have advised invasion if the dream had not come; 
Artabanus answers that not footsoldiers and ships but the land and sea themselves are arrayed against 
Xerxes’ army (οὔτε στρατὸν τοῦτον, ὅστις γε σύνεσιν ἔχει, μέμφοιτ᾽ ἂν οὔτε τῶν νεῶν τὸ 
πλῆθος· ἢν δὲ πλεῦνας συλλέξῃς, τὰ δύο τοι τὰ λέγω πολλῷ ἔτι πολεμιώτερα γίνεται. τὰ δὲ 
δύο ταῦτα ἐστὶ γῆ τε καὶ θάλασσα) (7.49.1). Xerxes then does not begin the expedition impiously; on 
the contrary, he genuinely believes, because of the dreams and in spite of practical arguments to the 
contrary, that his expedition is desired by the gods. For the sympathetic character of Herodotus’ portrayal 
of Xerxes, including his strong awareness of Persian nomos, see Sancisi-Weerdenburg 2002, Baragwanath 
2008 244-53. 
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mentioned in book 1 (τὴν γὰρ Ἀσίην καὶ τὰ ἐνοικέοντα ἔθνεα βάρβαρα 
οἰκηιεῦνται οἱ Πέρσαι, τὴν δὲ Εὐρώπην καὶ τὸ Ἑλληνικόν ἥγηνται 
κεχωρίσθαι) (1.4.4). Xerxes does indeed extend his war beyond tisis against Athens; 
Artemesia highlights this at 8.68 (asking rhetorically: ‘τί δὲ πάντως δέει σε 
ναυμαχίῃσι ἀνακινδυνεύειν; οὐκ ἔχεις μὲν τὰς Ἀθήνας, τῶν περ εἵνεκα 
ὁρμήθης στρατεύεσθαι;’) and at 8.101-2 transfers the risk of failure for the now fully 
imperial expedition from Xerxes, who will retire from Greece, to Mardonius, by way of 
the asymmetric relation that the king enjoys with his servant. 
When the expedition finally fails, Xerxes’ imperial expansionism returns to 
Candaules’ erotic boundary-violation, completing a ring-composition circling Herodotus’ 
entire work: the ring is closed in the Masistes logos (9.108-13) whose similarities to the 
Candaules logos have long been recognized.114 What makes Xerxes’ eros fail, however, 
is not phthonotic system-expansion, as in Candaules’ case, nor a foolish oath, which 
reveals Xerxes’ infidelity but does not contract his power; nor even a vengeful queen’s 
response to nomos-violation by establishing radical inverse proportionality between 
himself and another, as Candaules’ queen had done earlier. Rather, Amestris foils Xerxes 
by deliberate manipulation of a Persian nomos, which compels the king to grant whatever 
request is made of him on the anniversary of his accession or birth (9.110-11). 115 
Amestris, like Candaules’ wife, responds to Xerxes’ system-expansion by recontracting 
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 See n41. 
115
 The Greek is ambiguous here. The unique anointing of the king’s head on the day of this royal feast 
(τὴν κεφαλὴν σμᾶται μοῦνον βασιλεὺς (1.110.2)) may suggest that the day commemorates his royal 
accession rather than his personal birthday, but the literal ambiguity remains. 
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the erotic set, removing her rival by gruesome murder (1.112).116 The claim to unlimited 
Persian monarchy is falsified on the anniversary of the monarch’s accession: even 
Xerxes, king of kings, cannot do τὸ ἂν βούληται – because he is constrained by the 
Persian nomos that is applied by the queen.117 
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 In fact Xerxes had already switched his eros from Masistes’ wife to Masistes’ daughter (9.109.1), so 
Amestris is destroying her perceived rival. The apparent inappropriateness of Amestris’ response is 
striking, but she is not simply mistaken; but I hope to discuss this more fully in a later treatment of this 
passage. 
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 See Sancisi-Weerdenburg 2002, 586-88. 
  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
 This paper began by sketching a model for understanding the relation between 
tisis, nomos, and phthonos in the Histories. The conceptual complex was suggested by 
the structure and content of the opening narrative. The first incidents, reported by the 
Persians, are princess-thefts, each theft matched by another; and as long as the number of 
princess-thefts remains exactly equal on each side, the system of reciprocal and ‘equal for 
equal’ tisis remains unperturbed. The Greeks break this ‘equal for equal’ tisis-system by 
stealing a second princess, Medea, and refusing to pay dikas for her. This establishes a 
quantitative inequality, the first in the Histories that tisis does not address. This failure of 
tisis leads Paris to justify the rape of Helen by the Histories’ appeal to precedent, 
effectively marking the introduction of nomos. The disproportionate Greek response, the 
Persians say, is ‘greatly to blame’, and the cycle of enmity has begun. 
 The first passages in the Herodotean narrative thus introduce tisis as something 
responding to maintain quantitative equality, and nomos as something appealed to where 
maintenance of quantitative equality is no longer possible. Conceived in terms of 
systems, tisis maintains systemic homeostasis by matching every negative with a 
quantitatively identical positive, resulting in a final net equilibrium. Nomos does produce 
homeostasis by proportionalized (not equalized) negation, but by dividing the system into 
definite sections, which in their zero-sum relation thus exist in potential inverse 
proportionality to one another. The epistemological difference between tisis and nomos is 
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that tisis is self-evident, i.e., requires reference to nothing externally determined, whereas 
nomos is not self-evident, and requires reference to some definite division of the system 
in order to respond to system-perturbations. 
 Since the relevant systems are sets of humans and/or gods in some kind of proper 
relation – interstate, intrastate, or cosmic – the intrasystemic maintenance of nomotic 
divisions must be accomplished by humans and/or gods, and hence by certain properties 
of human and/or divine motivational structures. The human and divine property that does 
this work is phthonos, which responds whenever the benefit of one section of the system 
necessarily redounds to another’s harm. The sufficient conditions of phthonos, here given 
in terms of system-divisions, i.e., nomoi, can also be articulated in terms of relevant 
similarity, inasmuch as common membership in a nomotic system implies relevant 
similarity in respect of that system. These relevant similarities are sensible and intuitively 
discernible, whereas the system-division conditions are abstract and require thorough 
systemic analysis. The ‘relevant similarity’ conditions for phthonos are therefore more 
evident in a narrative account, which treats concrete events in chronological or 
narratological sequence, as opposed to a philosophical or theoretical account, which 
treats abstract terms in systems of abstract relations. 
 Herodotus’ opening narrative accordingly provides the ‘prime matter’ for an 
analysis of the sort presented in this paper. The content of the Histories does the rest of 
the work, fleshing out the structures introduced sketchily in the opening chapters, 
determining them with a greater level of specificity in the first authoritatively narrated 
episode, the Candaules logos. Here the sort of nomos-violation to which perturbation-
correctors respond is specified to erotic: Candaules establishes an inverse proportionality 
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inasmuch as he has eros for his wife’s beauty, in conjunction with his phthonotic 
insistence that she is the most beautiful of all women. Because his desire is erotic, it must 
be satisfied by physical means; since he believes specifically her eidos to be superior to 
all other women’s, these physical means must be sight. But a Lydian nomos, ‘look to 
one’s own’, restricts the set of those seeing his wife to one. When Candaules violates this 
nomos by the coercive power of his royal authority, his wife, a member of both the 
‘Lydian’ nomotic set and also the ‘one’s own’ nomotic subset, corrects the nomos-
violating perturbation by persuading Gyges to kill Candaules. She presents Gyges’ choice 
as a response to the radical inverse proportionality established by Candaules’ violation of 
the ‘look to one’s own’ nomos: in order for that nomos to be respected, the set described 
by that nomos must be recontracted to the definite quantity specified by that nomos. Since 
that set presently contains one more than the nomos-specified number, one member of 
that set must no longer exist. The queen allows Gyges to choose which member will 
cease to exist, and so in choosing simply to live Gyges chooses to kill the king. 
 This first episode presents the tisis-nomos-phthonos complex in remarkable 
clarity and simplicity, and hence provides an easy introduction to the far more intricate 
tisic-nomotic-phthonotic narratives to follow. The first of these narratives is the logos to 
which Herodotus attached the Candaules logos as an introduction, the Croesus logos. The 
most famous episode within the Croesus logos, Solon’s visit and interview, is given in 
chronological time immediately following Solon’s visit to Amasis in Egypt, which is 
analeptically mentioned within the opening of the Croesus logos. The appearance of 
Solon as a supremely important figure in Greek history narratively imports Solonian 
legislation and poetry; the legislative and poetic context is further determined, by the 
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chronological analepsis, to the specifically anti-phthonotic legislation that Solon took 
from Amasis in the next book. Herodotus’ formulation of this legislation describes a 
method of locating every member of a sociopolitical system in his proper place, each 
accounting for his own bios to the public nomarch so as to prove that his bios does not 
redound to others’ harm. Thus Herodotus’ formulation of Amasis/Solon’s law analyzes 
phthonos in terms of location within a sociopolitical system, as the model proposed 
earlier in the paper does also. Precisely this sociopolitical context constitutes a major 
component of Solon’s argument against Croesus’ phthonotic claim to be ‘the most 
blessed’. The second major component is death, the end of human life; so where the first 
treated the limits of humans in relation to others in the same state, the second treated the 
limits of human in themselves, or in relation to the gods. In fact, Solon refutes Croesus’ 
error by explicit appeal to the phthonos of the gods. 
 This expands the scope of phthonotic systems from those constituted of human-
human relations, of any size, to include those constituted of human-divine relations, i.e., 
the kosmos. The sorts of divisions maintained by the gods include the finitude of human 
life, as Solon observes, but also the unwritten and religious nomoi not safeguarded by 
humans within a given sociopolitical system. In the next passage considered in this paper, 
Cambyses violates both of these nomoi and is accordingly punished, at least partly by the 
nemesis of the gods. The acts the gods do not permit, however, are permitted by the 
Persian monarchical nomos, according to which the limits on the king’s power are 
identical to ‘whatever he wishes’, and hence potentially unlimited. Herodotus’ 
formulation of this ‘infinitizing’ law pushes inverse proportionality to an extreme: in 
79 
 
virtue of this law, the king is potentially related to all others in all systems such that his 
benefit redounds maximally to their harm. 
 The next king of the Persians, Darius, attempts to avoid the phthonos that such a 
condition generates by blocking the required inverse proportionality from obtaining, 
seeking to accomplish this by establishing relevant dissimilarity and expanding the limits 
of the Persian sociopolitical system. Inspired by Atossa to invade foreign lands, 
ultimately including Greece, Darius shows that he understands the danger of phthonos by 
his speech during the constitutional debate. His mode of accession, in contradistinction to 
Cyrus’, exacerbates this danger, but even Cyrus, by the end of his career, is not immune 
to phthonotic fear. Darius’ first appearance in the narrative, in Cyrus’ dream, is 
misinterpreted phthonotically; the result is a collapse of time, completely leaving out 
Cyrus’ death, as Croesus’ had earlier ignored the end of bios, for which Solon had 
arithmetically-religiously chided him. Darius’ attempt to avoid phthonos by establishing 
relevant dissimilarity from the Persians resembles Deioces’ attempt to dissociate himself 
from the Medes; but where Deioces relied on sheer deception, Darius attempts to 
establish real dissimilarity, which, in order to avoid inverse proportionality, requires 
extra-systemic, i.e., imperial, expansion. 
 These passages, which were analyzed in narrative order, progressively build an 
increasingly complex picture of the relations of humans to humans, and humans to gods. 
Atossa’s spur to imperialism, couched in terms of the tisis-nomos-phthonos complex 
already introduced in the opening narrative, brings Darius to the brink of the Persian 
Wars. Herodotus began his Histories to save Greek and barbarian wonders from erasure, 
and especially to explain the wars; his inquiry will end with the wars’ completion, and the 
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falsification of the Persian monarchs’ claim to limitlessness. This paper ends here for 
reasons of space and time, lest in violating these I should suffer some kind of 
perturbation-correction, from the academy or from the gods. The rest of the Histories, 
from Darius’ invasion of Scythia to Xerxes’ failure to conquer Greece, brings to full 
bloom the themes and concepts articulated crudely in the passages discussed to this point; 
but treating these passages is a task better reserved for another division of finite academic 
endeavor. 
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